

Chapter 8

Understanding Curriculum as Phenomenological Text

Curriculum is to be thought of . . . as meaning and as lived in.

(John Steven Mann, 1975, p. 147)

An educated person, first and foremost, understands that one's way of knowing, thinking, and doing flow from who one is. Such a person knows that an authentic person is more than a mere individual, an island unto himself or herself, but a being-in-relation with others and hence is, at core, an ethical being.

(Tetsuo Aoki, 1988b, pp. 8-9)

I

Introduction: A Poetic Activity

At the outset, let us acknowledge that phenomenologists would probably not use the notion of "text." For phenomenologists, experience and its conceptualization are distinguishable modalities. First is experience; language and thought follow. The poststructuralist notion of text, in which experience and thought are interwoven, is in fact a response to the phenomenological distinction between the two. At the conclusion of this chapter, we will focus on the links and discontinuities between phenomenology and poststructuralism. For now, note that a phenomenologist would simply entitle this chapter "understanding curriculum phenomenologically," or perhaps, simply, understanding curriculum, as the notion of understanding is a hermeneutical one [i.e. a process of interpretation; see the sections on hermeneutics later in this chapter and in chapter 12], requiring phenomenological inquiry. Because phenomenology contributed to certain strands of feminist theory (namely, the work of Madeleine Grumet and Janet Miller) and is inextricably linked with poststructuralism, we situate it between the two. However, the effort to understand curriculum phenomenologically is an autonomous and important curriculum discourse which, like the others we have identified, no responsible scholar can ignore.

Phenomenological curriculum theory. What is phenomenological inquiry? George Willis, who has worked on this question for a number of years (Willis, 1979), has answered that phenomenological inquiry is aesthetic and prehermeneutic, although he amends this (Willis, 1991). While phenomenological inquiry is accurately classified as a form of interpretive inquiry, it is

that form of interpretive inquiry which focuses on human perception and experience, particularly on what many would characterize as the aesthetic qualities of human experience: "In its most basic form, phenomenological inquiry investigates the distinctly human perceptions of individual people and results in descriptions of such perceptions which appear directly to the perceptions of other people" (Willis, 1991, pp. 173-174). In its contemporary forms, however, one cannot separate phenomenology and hermeneutics.

What is the history of phenomenological inquiry? Among "the earliest and most original studies," Willis (1991) cites three:

The first study, by Pinar and Grumet (1976), cuts into the onion intuitively but does not sufficiently use the empirical knife when necessary to cut cleanly. The second study, by van Manen (1978-1979), quickly and roughly slices empirically through the entire onion, but disregarding what this knife reveals, it then keeps on both empirically and intuitively peeling away the separate halves in search of an essential center. The third study, by Willis and Allen (1978), cuts cleanly into the onion empirically but not sufficiently deeply to reveal much more than can also be revealed by the intuitive knife alone. (p. 179)

In these judgments one finds the problems of phenomenology: it can seem "messy," not clean and rigorous as statistical studies have been alleged to be; it can seem mystical, aspiring to a truth that seems religious in nature, accessible only to those who believe. And when accessible, it can be superficial, risking a restatement of cultural clichés. We believe it is none of the three, although specific studies may suffer one or more of these problems. Phenomenology is a disciplined, rigorous effort to understand experience profoundly and authentically. In this effort, phenomenology becomes quite complex. Further, it is hardly monolithic; there is a wide range of phenomenological methodologies and themes. For example, several scholars emphasize the hermeneutical or interpretative aspect of phenomenological inquiry; others strive to honor a philosophical tradition of phenomenology; still others work in the space between phenomenology and poststructuralism.

While there are important differences among phenomenologists, for present purposes it is legitimate to conclude the following. The phenomenologist rejects both rationalism [in which the "bottom line" of reality is logic] and empiricism [as elaborated in twentieth century mainstream social science, the "bottom line" of reality is its mathematical representation in statistics] because they fail to account for the world as experienced by the human being. More specifically, both rationalism and empiricism fail to depict thought as it occurs in lived or "inner" time. The phenomenological investigator questions how phenomena—"the things themselves"—present themselves in the lived experience of the individual, especially as they present themselves in lived time. Consciousness becomes a major category for the phenomenologist. However, as Maxine Greene has observed, this term does not suggest introspection. Greene (1973) explained that human consciousness moves *toward* the world, not away from it. The term con-

consciousness speaks to the multiple ways in which objects, events, and other human beings are presented via the distinctly human processes of perceiving, judging, believing, remembering, and imagining. Phenomenologically understood, consciousness is characterized by intentionality: it is always of something which, when apprehended, relates to the act of consciousness involved as the meaning of that act.

While grounded in the world, phenomenological research is a "poetizing activity" (van Manen, 1984a, p. 2), an aesthetic rendering of experience, as Willis (1981) noted above. Working phenomenologically is rigorous; it requires a profound sense of what is competent and practical in educational conduct, and a sense of political consequence. One of the most prominent contemporary phenomenologists, Max van Manen (1984b), observes:

The increasing bureaucratization of pedagogic institutions and the technologizing effect of educational research and knowledge forms tend to erode our understanding and praxis of pedagogic competence in everyday life. It is in this sense that phenomenological research has radical consequences. . . . Phenomenology responds to the need for theory of the unique. . . . It is thoughtful learning which is at the heart of our pedagogic competence. (p. 19)

Just as feminist theory implies a politics of curriculum, so does phenomenology.

The lifeworld and one's biographic situation. As van Manen's comment makes clear, phenomenological scholarship is not mystical, not removed from the world. As Greene (1973) explained, the phenomenological concept of consciousness refers to an "experienced context" or lifeworld. The phenomenologist postulates his or her lifeworld as central to all that he or she does—including research and teaching—and as a consequence focuses upon the *biographic situation* (Pinar, 1994; see chapter 10) of each individual. Ordinarily the individual is unaware of his or her lifeworld; he or she is immersed in it. In this state, one adopts the natural attitude, taking for granted the reality and legitimacy of daily, practical life. The edges and boundaries of this attitude constitute the locations of self-reflexivity, of consciousness, necessary in order to reflect on or, in phenomenological terms, "bracket" the taken-for-granted. The great phenomenological philosopher, Martin Heidegger, conceived of difficulties or problems as occasions for becoming aware of the boundaries or horizons of the natural attitude. As Greene (1973) has observed, ordinary perception has to be suspended for questions to be posed. The individual has to be "shocked" into awareness of his or her own perception, into a recognition that one has constituted one's *own* lifeworld.

Characteristics of phenomenological research. As a beginning student, you may be a bit mystified at this juncture. You may appreciate the prospect of basing notions of curriculum and teaching upon your life as you live it, as you experience it. But how would such a notion be developed? What would be its characteristics? Van Manen observes that phenomenology comprehended intellectually differs from phenomenology understood "from the inside."

With Maurice Merleau-Ponty [along with Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, and Alfred Schutz, the fourth great philosopher of phenomenology], van Manen asserts that phenomenology can only authentically be understood by "doing it."

With that caveat, van Manen (1984a) sketches the following characteristics of phenomenological research: 1) Phenomenological research investigates lived experience. The phenomenological investigator studies the lifeworld as it is immediately experienced, presumably before we conceptualize it; one seeks to live in and report a deeper layer of experience than is accessible to most in the everyday "practical" world. The phenomenologist seeks a more direct experience of and encounter with the world. 2) Phenomenological research seeks the essence of experiences, employing an "eidetic reduction" to "bracket" the "natural attitude," or to reflect on one's taken-for-granted, commonsensical view of things (McEwen, 1980). These Husserlian notions point to what a phenomenon is, that which makes it "be." Thus phenomenological research is not interested in the frequency of events or their contiguity to other events; phenomenological research seeks instead the experience and meaning of events. Van Manen (1984a) makes this distinction by suggesting that phenomenology does not ask "how" questions, but rather "what" questions, as in what is the nature of the experience of learning? 3) Phenomenological research is the conscious practice of "thoughtfulness." Van Manen writes that "thoughtfulness" characterizes phenomenology perhaps more aptly than any other single word. Thoughtfulness is defined as "minding," a "heeding," for Heidegger an "attunement" to what it feels like and means to be alive. Phenomenological pedagogy becomes an expression of thoughtfulness. 4) Phenomenological research does not produce knowledge for knowledge's sake; rather it produces knowledge to disclose what it means to be human. The phenomenological researcher works to comprehend the meaning of being in the world, as man, woman, child. Such comprehension requires knowledge of historical, cultural, and political traditions. [In this regard, McEwen (1980) postulates an "intentional" geography which would stress subjectivity and intersubjectivity, especially attitudes, values, and beliefs, in the phenomenological study of that school subject.] 5) Phenomenological research always embodies a poetic quality. John Ciardi (1960) has explained that a poem cannot be reduced to a summary, to a capsule meaning, but rather, to understand a poem is to participate in "how a poem means." Likewise, phenomenological research cannot be reduced to "results." Like poetry, phenomenology attempts an incantational, evocative speaking, a primal telling, wherein the phenomenologist aims to utilize the voice to present an original singing of the world (van Manen, 1984a). We may say that phenomenological language "sings" the world.

Phenomenological research methodology. How is phenomenological research conducted? Polakow (1984a) described phenomenological research as involving the careful exploration of densely textured moments which point beyond the immediacy of the context in which they occur. Van Manen identified

what he terms as four "procedural activities" to guide such exploration. First, the phenomenological investigator chooses a phenomenon which interests him or her in a serious way and simultaneously pulls him or her into the world. Authentic phenomenological research is not narcissistic nor is it idealistic in the classical philosophical sense. Serious phenomenological research attunes and pulls the investigator and the student more deeply into the world. Second, the phenomenological researcher investigates the identified phenomenon as it is lived, not merely as it is theorized. Third, the phenomenological researcher reflects upon the essential themes or structures which characterize the phenomenon (Barritt, et al., 1984). Finally, the researcher describes the phenomenon via the art of writing (van Manen, 1984b). Robert Burch (1989) summarizes: "[Phenomenology] seeks a transcending theoretical understanding that goes beyond lived experience to situate it, to judge it, to comprehend it, endowing lived experience with new meaning" (p. 192).

An outline for conducting phenomenological research. Van Manen (1984b) outlines a methodology for "doing" phenomenology:

- A. Turning to the Nature of Lived Experience
 1. Orienting to the phenomenon
 2. Formulating the phenomenological question
 3. Explicating assumptions and preunderstandings
- B. Existential Investigation
 4. Exploring the phenomenon: generating "data"
 - 4.1 Using personal experience as a starting point
 - 4.2 Tracing etymological sources
 - 4.3 Searching idiomatic phrases
 - 4.4 Obtaining experiential descriptions from subjects
 - 4.5 Locating experiential descriptions in literature, art, etc.
 5. Consulting phenomenological literature
- C. Phenomenological Reflection
 6. Conducting thematic analysis
 - 6.1. Uncovering thematic aspects in lifeworld descriptions
 - 6.2. Isolating thematic statements
 - 6.3. Composing linguistic transformations
 - 6.4. Gleaning thematic descriptions from artistic sources
 7. Determining essential themes
- D. Phenomenological Writing
 8. Attending to the speaking of language
 9. Varying the examples
 10. Writing
 11. Rewriting: (A) to (D), etc. (van Manen, 1984b).

Not every phenomenological curriculum theorist follows this procedure precisely, although in the phenomenological studies described in this chapter

you will notice various elements of this procedure. Certainly van Manen's outline is a useful one for beginning students who wish to investigate this way of understanding curriculum.

The range of phenomenological curriculum research. The categories of curriculum research which have been explored phenomenologically are often quite unlike those pursued by mainstream educational research. A few categories follow closely from primary phenomenological texts, for example those which dwell on issues of language, temporality, and consciousness. Other categories are more typically associated with curriculum, such as teaching and reading. Such topics are treated differently, however, from the mainstream research literature, and from other curriculum research traditions. For instance, van Manen is interested in the *tone* of teaching, rather than in, for example, behavioral objectives or in teachers as a socioeconomic class with political interests. For him, the point of research is to attune or orient ourselves to children and teaching. Greene explored the role of *wide-awakeness* in teaching and learning. Grumet is interested in reading as an *embodied* activity. Aoki, Greene, Grumet, Pinar, and van Manen have explicated phenomenological critiques of mainstream educational research. Sometimes unusual topics are explored. For instance, consider the following themes: the "secret place" (Langeveld, 1983a, 1983b), pain (Raffel, 1984), loyalty (Moore 1984), the joke (Karatheodoris, 1984), the child prodigy (Allen, Bonner, & Moore, 1984), and adolescence as metaphor (Michalko, 1984). Vangie Kelpin (1985) has written on an aspect of pregnancy in her "Ear on the Belly: A Question of Fetal Monitors." David W. Jardine (1990) has written "On the Humility of Mathematical Language." Clearly, there is a thematic distinctiveness to much phenomenological curriculum scholarship.

Much of this research has occurred at the University of Alberta, the center for phenomenological studies in education in the Western hemisphere. Under the leadership of Ted Aoki, Max van Manen, Kenneth Jacknicke, and Terrence Carson, among others (Pinar & Reynolds, 1992c), phenomenology has been institutionalized at the University of Alberta, especially in the Department of Secondary Education. Chair of the Department from 1977 through 1985, Aoki's contribution was central, so much so that his retirement from that office was acknowledged in an international event honoring his accomplishment [see Carson, 1987; Pinar, 1987; Werner, 1987; Jacknicke, 1987; Martel, 1987; Bath, 1987; Aoki, 1987a]. A partial list (in chronological order beginning with the most recent) of the titles of Ph.D. dissertations completed in that Department reveals the range of phenomenological doctoral research conducted there, many under the academic supervision of those four men. You will notice that van Manen and Carson are Ph.D. graduates of the Department, having both worked with Aoki: *Justice in Evaluation: Participatory Case Study Evaluation* (Bath, 1988), *A Critical Understanding of Technology and Educational Development: A Case Study of the Korean Educational Development Institute* (Sung, 1986), *The Meaning of Morality and Moral Education: An Interpretative Study of the Moral Education Curriculum in Korea* (Oh,

1986), *Understanding the Meaning of Teacher Competence: An Interpretative Study of a Teacher Education Curriculum in Korea* (Hur, 1986), *Curriculum Orientation within Religious Education Programs for Catholic Secondary Schools* (van Damme, 1985), *A Hermeneutic Investigation of the Meaning of Curriculum Implementation for Consultants and Teachers* (Carson, 1984), *Social Worlds: British Columbia Social Studies Curriculum Unit "Developing the Tropical World" as Reflected Through the Writings of George Herbert Mead and Alfred Schutz* (Harrison, 1984), *Toward Understanding the Lived-World of Lebanese Muslim Students and their Teachers* (Fahlman, 1984), *Toward Understanding the Lived World of Three Beginning Teachers of Young Children* (Turner, 1984), *Re-Searching the Teachers' Perspective of Curriculum: A Case Study of Piloting a Home Economics Curriculum* (Peterat, 1983), *Re-Searching the Meaning of Consulting in Continuing Teacher Education through Phenomenological and Critical Inquiry Orientations* (Favaro, 1982), *A Study of Perspective in Social Studies* (Werner, 1977), and *Toward a Cybernetic Phenomenology of Instruction* (van Manen, 1973). Phenomenological research is sometimes found in traditionally conservative departments, for instance, in the Department of Educational Psychology at the University of Alberta (Daniel, 1991).

Phenomenological Themes. We organize the remainder of our study of curriculum as phenomenological text in the following way. First, we will summarize phenomenological critiques of mainstream social science. This critique will include attention to the phenomenological notion of lived experience and to issues of self-report. Next we "backtrack" a little, and review Huebner's groundbreaking work in the 1960s and 1970s toward the reconceptualization of curricular language. As we also saw in chapter 4, Huebner's pathfinding scholarship thirty years ago helped make possible some of the work being done now, for instance, David Smith's rehabilitation of the concept of the practical. Following is a discussion of hermeneutics which in contemporary phenomenological research functions as a medium of political work. Next are phenomenological depictions of teaching or pedagogy, followed by research on reading and writing. Concluding the chapter are reviews of scholarship concerning two important phenomenological themes, the secret place and temporality. Let us turn first to the phenomenological critique of mainstream social science, a tradition of research in which rationalism and empiricism dominate.

II

Critique of Mainstream Social Science: Aoki, Grumet, Jardine

The rules for the understanding of meaning are constructed actively by those who dwell within the situation.

(T. Aoki, 1988a, p. 411)

Several phenomenological scholars have critiqued mainstream social science. Ted Aoki (1988a) characterized mainstream social science, especially quantitative educational research, as exhibiting an instrumentalist interest in

control. That is, "empirical-analytical" social science identifies concepts or "variables" and investigates their interrelations statistically. The truthfulness of the "facts" and "generalizations" produced are said to constitute their usefulness. Aoki notes that this "empirical-analytic" tradition implies a radical separation of person and world, in sharp contrast to both phenomenological and aesthetic modes of knowing. This separation permits and supports a view of the manipulability of "objects," including students, in the world. Because "subject" and "object" are separate domains, the "empirical" researcher understands "objectively" or definitively. [Autobiographical research aspires to understand the experience of the individual from the point of view of that individual—see chapter 10; political curriculum theory insists "objectivity" is a political and epistemological impossibility, given that neither knowledge or the processes of knowledge production are politically neutral—see chapter 5.] A related assumption of the "empirical-analytic" tradition is that all of life can be explained, if not with certainty, at least with probability. Thus the prediction of events—both human and "natural" (say earthquakes)—is a realistic scientific goal (Aoki, 1988a). For teachers this view gets expressed as certainties regarding "what works," apparently regardless of the socioeconomic conditions of the students, the historical moment, and the geographic-cultural "place" where the class occurs (Kincheloe & Pinar, 1991).

Skepticism regarding prediction. Pinar (1988c) also challenged this general view that human conduct can be predicted. Relying on the work of Bauman (1978), he noted that if human conduct could be regularized, then the costly "scientific" research mounted in the social sciences would have succeeded. It is because human beings exhibit will, imagination, and the capacity to choose in light of their own "horizons" (a phenomenological idea) that mainstream social science research has not succeeded in its aspiration to predict with certainty. He observed that there are profound ethical questions for those who make the attempt. In education, the empirical-analytic tradition has found various expressions, including management by objectives, competency-based education, criterion-based testing, and behavioral objectives in which students become categories. Aoki (1988a) summarized: "It is an objectified world within which even people are transformed into objects, their subjectivities reduced out" (p. 410). Van Manen (1988) observed that mainstream research lacks connections with a "practical pedagogic orientation to children in their concrete lives" (p. 438). From the phenomenological tradition, mainstream social science is epistemologically impossible and ethically unimaginable.

First-order and second-order experience. Phenomenology advises social science to recall its "lived" origins and foundations. Merleau-Ponty asserted: "The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced and if we want to subject science to rigorous study . . . we must begin by re-awakening the basic experience of the world in which science is the second-order experience" (Merleau-Ponty, quoted in Aoki 1988a, p. 410). This

declaration sets the stage for the phenomenological project, a project which explores and articulates that "first-order" experience of which Merleau-Ponty speaks, from which the academic disciplines and school curriculums are derived. Phenomenologically then, the curriculum researcher studies those who live within the "here and now" of a situation. The "life situation" is portrayed in ways which reflect an "insider's" experience. The central interest, Aoki (1988a) says, "is in communicative understanding of meanings given by people who live within the situation. The rules for the understanding of meaning are constructed actively by those who dwell within the situation" (p. 411).

Situation, a phenomenological concept, denotes those elements of a setting which are organized by the intentionality (the horizon of perceptions and understandings) of the individual or group. The forms of knowledge generated by (post-Husserlian) phenomenological research are not nomological (i.e. facts, laws, scientific theories) but rather meaning situationally understood and communicated. Reality is no longer "out there," separate from the observed. Reality becomes an intersubjective construct to be formulated and negotiated intersubjectively. From this perspective, the reality of classroom life is viewed as the construction of those who dwell within those situations (Aoki, 1988a). [Curriculum evaluation (Aoki, 1986a) has been influenced by these points of view—see chapter 13. It has developed along separate but not unrelated lines; see, for instance, the work of Elliot W. Eisner, although he is not regarded as a phenomenologist.]

Other critiques of empiricism. The epistemological assumptions of mainstream social science have also been criticized by Madeleine R. Grumet, the important feminist theorist whose scholarship we examined in the preceding chapter, work which reveals phenomenological influences. Grumet (1976a) argued that so-called "empiricism" discounts the distortions inherent in laboratory settings. Instead, it concentrates solely on behaviors that are quantifiable, and in so doing, upon passive, manipulable "subjects" who have surrendered their capacities to direct their own conduct, report their own experience. Phenomenological research is less concerned with behavior than it is with an individual's or group's understandings of and attitudes toward behavior. Grumet quotes Alfred Schutz to communicate this concern:

Meaning does not lie in experience. Rather, those experiences are meaningful which are grasped reflectively. That meaning is in the way in which the Ego regards its experience. The meaning lies in the attitudes of the Ego toward that part of its stream of consciousness which has already flowed by. (Schutz, quoted in Grumet, 1976a, p. 37)

David W. Jardine (1987) provides a phenomenological critique of the notions of reflection and self-understanding in Piagetian theory, a critique which underlines points of divergence between mainstream social science and phenomenology. Jardine (1987) argues that Piaget's claims regarding the self-sufficiency of scientific discourse:

tend . . . to close off that discourse from the whole complex of human life out of which that discourse has emerged. Of course, it is not closed off in fact. . . . In spite of the rich manner in which Piaget describes the developmental emergence of scientific discourse out of sensorimotor, preoperational, concrete-operational, and eventually, formal-operational actions of the subject, what seems to emerge out of all of this, where all of this seems to be heading, is toward an idealized caricature of the nature and place of science. (p. 11)

Jardine goes on to point out that the developmental accomplishment of scientific discourse in Piaget's schema involves an orientation to an ideal of explicit interpretation, a compensation for the natural tendency of thought to operate implicitly or unconsciously. One of the principal processes in the achievement of scientific discourse is the process of reflection. However, Jardine argues that reflection, in a Piagetian sense, becomes an abstraction, and as such, it is a feature of the development of cognition. Jardine (1987) summarizes:

Formal logic is, in a peculiar way, exemplary of the pinnacle of self-awareness, since with formal logic, the operations performed on an object and the object of those operations are identical. It seems, then, that the notion of self-understanding begins to dovetail with a notion of self-explicitness. (p. 14)

Self-understanding in Piagetian theory, then, is not simply an explicitness regarding one's interpretation such that understanding can be assured; it is the developmental achievement of a "decentered subject" (Piaget, quoted in Jardine, p. 15). Self-understanding in Piaget's version of scientific discourse requires, then, the methodical reconstruction of one's place in the world such that, that place becomes indistinguishable from any other place, given that one is referring to "others" who are at the same developmental level.

In contrast to this scientific version of self-understanding are those principles involved in a phenomenological notion of practical self-understanding. Jardine (1987) identifies the following principles:

1) Practical self-understanding and reflection are localized and concrete in two different senses: a) they are embedded in a . . . particular biography (or life-history) . . . b) my beliefs, understandings and the like are not in question or at issue "in general" or "in theory" but in the midst of a concrete context, and a localized set of practices, such as the practice of teaching. 2) Practical self-understanding and reflection require the cultivation of an experience of ownership and appropriation. 3) [They] . . . are temporal and contingent. 4) [They] . . . are occasioned. More often than not, one does not produce self-understanding *ex nihilo* as some self-generated, theoretical exercise, but in confrontation with others whose beliefs, attitudes or understandings are different from my own. (pp. 16-18)

In these four statements, Jardine (1987) summarizes the main distinctions between mainstream social science and phenomenology. Phenomenology embraces the world as we live it, but in the process, invites us to change the way we live. Our taken-for-granted notions of self-understanding, reflection, and practical competence are all reconceived in phenomenological inquiry.

Phenomenological Foundations of *Currere*

One form of curriculum research that incorporates the phenomenological critique of mainstream social science is *currere*, a phenomenologically related form of autobiographical curriculum theory. Grumet cited *currere* as a method and theory of curriculum which escapes the epistemological traps of mainstream social science and educational research. *Currere* focuses on the educational experience of the individual, as reported by the individual. Rather than working to quantify behaviors to describe their surface interaction or to establish causality, *currere* seeks to describe what the individual subject him or herself makes of these behaviors. As Harré and Secord suggested, the "most profound discoveries of social psychology will be made by those who, while playing a part, filling a role and so on, can be their own audience" (Harré & Secord, quoted in Grumet, 1976a, p. 38). Husserlian phenomenology undergirds the method of *currere*, particularly the emphasis upon the reciprocity between subjectivity and objectivity in the constitution of experience and meanings. *Currere* shares phenomenology's interest in describing immediate, preconceptual experience, and then makes use of the phenomenological processes of "distancing" and "bracketing" required to do so. The notion of "constitution," central to both *currere* and to Husserlian phenomenology, is founded on Brentano's formulation of "intentionality" as a fundamental structure of consciousness. Intentionality specifies that all consciousness is consciousness of something, and so the subject, as subject, is accessible to oneself via the object intended. Grumet (1976a) noted:

Objective constitution is the life of the subject; knowledge of self becomes knowledge of self as knower of the world, not just as a passive recipient of stimuli from the objective world, not as an expression of latent subjectivity, but as a bridge between these two domains, a mediator. The homunculus of educational experience resides in each cogitation. (p. 38)

Consciousness not passive. Edmund Husserl (1962, 1964, 1970) rejected the determinism which undergirds so-called empiricism, which portrays consciousness as the passive recipient of sense impression. Husserl rejected as well philosophical idealism which, while denying knowledge of the world to human beings, consoled them with the definitiveness of the constructions of their own minds. Instead, he wished to understand those events belonging to human encounters with the world. Husserl explained:

When phenomenology examines objects of consciousness—regardless of any kind, whether real or ideal—it deals with these exclusively as objects of the immediate consciousness. The description—which attempts to grasp the concrete and rich phenomena of the cogitations—must constantly glance back from the side of the object to the side of consciousness, and pursue the general existing connections. (Husserl, 1964, quoted in Grumet 1976a, p. 39)

Currere draws support for its focus upon lived experience from Husserl's conviction that only in the immediacy and intensity of encounter can certainty reside. To that end Husserl formulated a system of disciplined

reflection to assess the adequacy and fullness of this certainty, a system designed to produce knowledge grounded in the lived experience of the subject.

Lived experience. What is the character of lived experience? Husserl postulated a series of "now-points," each expressing horizons of past and imminent nows, passing into retention or portension. Merleau-Ponty (1962, 1963) pointed to this prereflective flow of now-points:

to return to things in themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is. (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, quoted in Grumet 1976a, p. 40)

Unlike mainstream educational research which focuses upon the end products of the processes of consciousness as described by Husserl, those end products we call concepts, abstractions, conclusions, and generalizations we, in accumulative fashion, call knowledge. *Currere* seeks to slide underneath these end products and structures to the preconceptual experience that is their foundation. *Currere* is designed to act as the phenomenological *epoché*, slackening "the intentional threads which attach us to the world and thus bring them to our notice" (Merleau-Ponty, 1962, quoted in Grumet, 1976a, p. 41).

Distancing and the immediacy of experience. Through the practice of the method of *currere*, the researcher attempts a phenomenological description of both subject and object, requiring knowledge of self as knower of the world, attempting to trace the complex path from preconceptual experience to formal intellection. As formulated and practiced by Pinar and Grumet (1976), *currere* does not constitute a reflective retreat from the world, but a heightened engagement with it. As a research methodology, *currere* has employed literature as a foil for the reflection of the investigator. As a reader, the research recreates what the writer has created, and in so doing, creates another world, drawn both from the substance of his or her experience and fantasy and from the literature itself. This conscious and explicit participation in an aesthetic experience—it becomes like an archeology—illustrates the reciprocity of objectivity and subjectivity in the student's and teacher's experience of the curriculum. It extends to both student and teacher the artist's awareness that subjectivity transforms the objectivity it seeks to describe. In this way, phenomenology and the aesthetic process share that distancing from the everyday and the familiar in order to see them with a freshness and immediacy which is like seeing them for the first time.

The autobiography this form of phenomenological curriculum research produces asks questions like Husserl's. For instance, to what extent does reflection, even the rigorous and disciplined reflection of *currere*, deform experience to fit preexistent categories? Does the prolonged and profound

practicing of the distancing required by phenomenological research in general and by the method of *currere* in particular loosen the bonds of commitment and action that bind us to the concrete, public world? Can the reflecting self be split off rather than continuous with the public, acting self? Do multiple social roles shred the self into situation poses strung along a temporal chain? (Grumet, 1976a)

Grounded in context. Grumet reminds us that quantitative methodology avoids these questions. Indeed, such questions become disguised by the atomization of the lived situation into quantifiable variables, and by a series of controls that creates an unreal world as a backdrop for another unreal variable. *Currere*, in contrast, is grounded in context. The method of *currere* offers the opportunity to study both the individual's lived experience and the impact of the social milieu upon that experience. It seeks to depict and reflectively comprehend the impact of milieu as well as the subject's past upon the educational experience of the individual in the present. In contrast to the conventional empirical-analytic paradigm of educational research, *currere* returns to the experience of the individual, searching for those qualities which disqualify them for consideration in the mainstream behavioral sciences: its idiosyncratic history, its preconceptual and lived foundations, its contextual dependency, and its capacity for freedom and intelligence in choice and action.

The importance of self-report. Pinar and Grumet were not the only scholars who linked phenomenology and autobiography. For instance, Ronald J. Silvers (1984) stressed the importance of self-report in the teaching of phenomenology. He viewed biography as the "locus of experiences of self." To teach phenomenological reflection, Silvers suggested, the following features of such reflection must be understood: 1) It includes commitment to nonobjectifying interpretive analysis for the recovery of existential meanings. 2) This commitment is made manifest in the introduction of personal experience and sentiment through the biographical narrative. 3) The biographical narrative is the initial point of a reflectivity upon our own consciousness and its embeddedness in our language. 4) Reflectivity upon language brings attention to one's own discourse as an expressive movement of "reflective discourse." 5) Reflective discourse is made possible by an absence of a prestructure and the presence of an uncertainty in the direction of the eventual theoretical formulation beyond the personal of the biographical narrative. 6) Participating in self-reflection as a joint communicative movement is found in a dialectic of meditation as a tension between the solitary movement of reflective thought and the social movement of communication (Silvers, 1984).

Currere as autobiographical self-report communicates the individual's lived experience as it is socially located, politically positioned, and discursively formed, while working to succumb to none of these structurings. It is, in an essential way, phenomenological in character. However, it is not exclusively

phenomenological. We will examine *currere* as autobiographical theory in chapter 10.

III

Curriculum Language: Huebner and Smith

Educational activity can symbolize the meanings felt and lived by educators.

(Dwayne E. Huebner, 1975b, p. 227)

When they focus on the illumination of the lived experience of teachers, curriculum workers are concentrating their attention on what is, in actuality, the operating curriculum in every school.

(J. Timothy Leonard, 1983, pp. 24-25)

As we noted, Dwayne Huebner was the first to introduce phenomenology to curriculum studies at the 1967 Curriculum Theory Conference held at Ohio State University [see chapter 3]. In that early work on temporality, Huebner examined the significance of language in the field [a continuing concern for Huebner; see, Huebner, 1993 and chapter 15; also see Dobson, Dobson, & Koetting, 1987]. Huebner argued that curriculum language was constrained by two myths embedded within it: that of learning and purpose. Learning he identifies with educational psychology and the empirical-analytic tradition; as such it becomes a technical term of control (Huebner, 1975b). He traced the then ubiquitous use of learning in curriculum conceptualizations to traditional curriculum thought. As we noted in chapter 3, Tyler conceived the problems of curriculum as being only four: the formulation of objectives or purposes, the selection of learning experiences, the organization of these learning experiences, and their evaluation. Huebner argued that "learning" and "objectives" or purposes need to be replaced:

the language of learning and purpose must be cast aside and new questions asked. To do so the curriculum worker must confront his reality directly, not through the cognitive spectacles of a particular language system. One is then forced to ask, "What language or language system can be used to talk about these phenomena?" His reality must be accepted not his language; for many language systems may be used for a given reality. (Huebner, 1975b, p. 221)

The phenomenological distinction between language and reality, between lived experience or preconceptual experience, is evident here. Huebner then replaced learning and purpose with the following: "The central notion of curricular thought can be that of 'valued activity.' All curricular workers attempt to identify and/or develop 'valued educational activity'" (Huebner 1975b, p. 222).

Huebner's five value frameworks. Huebner then explicated five "value frameworks" curricular workers might use to assess the value of particular educational activities: the technical, the political, the scientific, the aesthetic, and the ethical. The technical he associates with the Tyler Rationale and its

successors, the political with bureaucratic and community politics [which anticipates the work of his most prominent student, Michael Apple; see chapter 5], and the scientific with quantitative research. The aesthetic and ethical frameworks reflect a rudimentary phenomenology of curriculum. The aesthetic value of educational activity has three dimensions, Huebner maintained. First is the element of psychical distance. Because the aesthetic object is removed from the daily, practical world, it becomes possible to achieve perceptual distance from it. Huebner suggests that its spontaneity is evident:

It is spontaneity captured, normally lost in the ongoing world. Because of aesthetic distance, the art object, in this case educational activity, is the possibility of life, captured and heightened and standing apart from the world of production, consumption and intent. The art object has beauty. Educational activity can have beauty. (Huebner, 1975b, p. 226)

The second dimension is wholeness and design: "Educational activity may thus be valued in terms of its sense of wholeness, of balance, of design and of integrity, and its sense of peace or contentment" (Huebner, 1975b, p. 226). Here Huebner anticipates the evaluation work of Elliot Eisner [see chapter 13]. The third dimension:

... is that of symbolic meaning. The esthetic object, indeed educational activity, may be valued for the meanings that it reveals, and may be valued for its truth. Educational activity is symbolic of the meanings of the educator, as an individual and as a [spokesperson for men and women]. . . . The meaninglessness and routine of much educational activity today reflects the meaninglessness and routine of a mechanistic world order. In the rare classroom is the possible vitality and significance of life symbolized by the excitement, fervor, and community of educational activity. Educational activity can symbolize the meanings felt and lived by educators. (Huebner 1975b, p. 227)

The ethical dimension. The ethical dimension of educational value refers to the sense in which educational activity is a human encounter among persons. This encounter is judged according to ethical categories. Ethically, then, "metaphysical and perhaps religious language become the primary vehicle for the legitimation and thinking through of educational activity" (p. 227). Employing phenomenological language, Huebner (1975b) observed that:

For some, the encounter of man with man [sic] is seen as the essence of life, and the form that this encounter takes is the meaning of life. The encounter is not *used* to produce change, to enhance prestige, to identify new knowledge, or to be symbolic of something else. The encounter is. In it is the essence of life. In it life is revealed and lived. The student is not viewed as an object, an *it*; but as a fellow human being, another subject, a *thou*, who is to be lived with in the fullness of the present moment or the eternal present. From the ethical stance the educator meets the student, not as an embodied role, as a lesser category, but as a fellow human being who demands to be accepted on the basis of fraternity not simply on the basis of equality The fullness of educational activity, as students encounter each other, the world around them,

and the teacher, is all there is. The educational activity is life—and life's meanings are witnessed and lived in the classroom. (pp. 227-228)

Toward reconceptualization of curricular language. In the 1960s, as we saw in chapters 3 and 4, Dwayne Huebner challenged the dominance of the Tyler Rationale and the atheoretical and ahistorical tradition it had spawned. Huebner urged a critique of conventional curricular language to lead to a new language, which in turn, would lead to new conduct in classrooms. This critique would be phenomenological in nature. Huebner quoted Karl Jaspers approvingly: "We become aware of the fact that in cognition we have moved in categories which, even in their totality, are like a fine filigree with which we grasp what at the same time we conceal with it" (Jaspers, 1959, pp. 38, 79, quoted in Huebner, 1975b, p. 233). From this awareness the curriculum theorist and classroom teacher might view educational activity ethically and aesthetically as well as technically. Huebner (1975b) explained:

present curricular language is much too limited to come to grips with the problems, or rather the mysteries, of language and meaning of the classroom. The educator must free himself from his self-confining schemas, in order that he may listen anew to the world pounding against his intellectual barriers. The present methodologies which govern curricular thought must eventually give way. (p. 235)

Written in 1966, these words anticipated the Reconceptualization of curriculum studies of the 1970s, a major element of which was the phenomenological movement. This movement would indeed create a new language, one which took as a central tenet Huebner's Heideggerean view (Heidegger, 1962) that speech is the human being's reply as he or she listens to the world.

The practical. Huebner laid the groundwork for a phenomenological reconceptualization of curricular language. One salient illustration of this revision of conventional language concerns the crucial concept of the "practical." Working twenty years after Huebner's landmark scholarship, David G. Smith took the Husserlian notion of "eidetics" and rethought the concept. Recalling Schwab's 1969 call for studies of the practical [see chapters 3 and 4], he insists that it does not imply "nuts and bolts technical know-how of mindless practice." Quoting Schwab, Smith agrees that the practical is "a complex discipline . . . concerned with choice and action." What is needed, Schwab declared, is "a totally new and extensive pattern of empirical study of classroom life as a basis for beginning to know what we are doing, what we are not doing, and to what effect" (Schwab, quoted in Smith, 1988a, pp. 417-418). Phenomenologically understood, empirical research does not imply quantitative research. Etymologically, "empirical" (from the Greek *empeira*) means to acknowledge one's experience as the basis of knowledge. Experience is a complicated term with a long history. Phenomenologically, however, it refers to that which is "lived," not merely that which can be observed and measured. Phenomenologically conceived, empirical research "has to do with the whole person standing in the whole of life trying to make

sense of his/her experience of it all in its wholeness" (Smith, 1988a, p. 418). Consequently, claims to truth are always partial and incomplete. Their partiality and incompleteness are not liabilities, but the characteristics of the uniquely specific and individual character of experience and knowledge.

Critical of political analysts for being too restrictive in their views, David Smith (1988a) argued that curriculum research must—in addition to social critique—make explicit the character of day-to-day life, as it is experience of and lived by those in classrooms. He suggested that most educators are blind to the specific character of their daily lives, a blindness tantamount to innocence: "The root of injustice is not moral error but blindness" (Gadamer, quoted in Smith, 1988a, p. 419). Curriculum research must restore vision and bring knowledge to the innocent, in order that they might "love." [See Noddings, 1981; Pinar, 1981a; Edgerton, 1993a]. Smith quotes Goethe: "We only understand what we love" (p. 420). The agenda of curriculum research must include developing insight into the character of our daily lives, as "lived."

Autobiography and dialogue. The autobiographical work of Pinar and Grumet (1976) would seem to provide such insight. While praising this scholarship as "helpful" in "revealing the sorts of personal struggles many of us face," Smith (1988) criticized *currere* as overinterested in exploration and expression of the individual self and underinterested in dialogue and in the experience of others. Other phenomenologists—such as Aoki (1988a)—have praised autobiographical research as legitimately phenomenological. Grumet herself has both detailed the relation of autobiography to phenomenology and written one of the most complex and accomplished phenomenological curriculum studies to date (Grumet, 1976a, 1988a).

After criticizing both political and autobiographical studies as insufficient, Smith outlines his own view of "experimental eidetics." He explains *eidōs*, derived from Plato and Husserl, refers to "that which is present behind appearances, yet which gives appearances their uniqueness, vividness and detail" (p. 421). Rejecting Platonic idealism, Smith affirms the Heideggerean view of language as expressing an implicit ontology. Thus Smith views concepts and events and so-called facts as "somehow uniquely expressive of something which makes them possible, rather than as things final and discrete in their own right" (Smith, D., 1988a, p. 421).

The present as past and future. Heidegger's student, Hans-Georg Gadamer (1960, 1976, 1980), accepted this view of language but grounds it in history. Gadamer viewed historicity as fundamental to human experience. Further, understanding this historicity is prior to understanding ourselves. For Gadamer, and for Smith, understanding is dialectical in nature, requiring elucidation of past, present, and future. Smith (1988a) writes "when I look at a classroom situation, I do not see it as 'present;' I see it as 'presently' expressing its history while at the same time as embodying within itself a sense of hope for the future" (p. 422). Such hope is frustrated in schools,

according to Smith, when teachers and others accept the language of conventional curriculum experts as definitive truth rather than as interpretations. The pretense at definitiveness characteristic of positivistic curriculum language precludes conversation, dialogue, and debate and allows "only a mindless, ritual acting out of the working of other people's minds. . . . That is a form of madness" (p. 422).

To take seriously the classroom in a phenomenological sense is to portray the specificity and concreteness of our daily lives. To do so requires viewing the everyday in its eidetic quality, i.e. as referring to "something else" as well as to itself. Heidegger believed that the everyday "speaks" to us, suggesting who and what we are as human beings. Gadamer asserts that our language tells us who we are now, and who we were once and who we hope to become.

David Smith undertakes to illustrate these ideas by describing a grade five social studies class in British Columbia. After telling us about the class, Smith (1988a) summarizes the distinctive qualities of viewing curriculum conceived as phenomenological text:

. . . the curriculum enterprise, at bottom, is not simply a technical, up-front, visible, manipulative enterprise performed by experts, be they teachers, planners, or politicians. Rather, all those manifest activities are eidetic: they are visible expressions of an invisible life which makes them possible. Making articulate that invisible life is the poetic art of phenomenological description. . . . An attention to the eidetic quality of our life together is an attempt to bring into the center of our research conversation everything that we are, as a way of reconciling in the present moment our ends with our beginnings. Where will such a conversation "get us?" In a sense it will not "get us" anywhere. (pp. 434-435)

Language as "home." Conventional speech, for Heidegger, was tantamount to chatter, an evasion of important matters. David Smith regards much educational language similarly. Mainstream instructional literature expresses a concept of language as a "tool of communication," a skill. Such a conception does not permit one to utilize language to orient oneself toward the world, indeed to find a home. Like Huebner, Smith views the traditional language of the curriculum as institutional text (i.e. that of objectives, and competencies) as having little to do with the lived experience of children or, for that matter, with the lived experience of teachers. He suspects many teachers make a "schizophrenic compromise" whereby they use educational jargon with the principal and other supervisors but drop it when they re-enter the life of classrooms. Smith views the task of the teacher as recovering those forms of life, and specifically those language forms, which enable him or her to be with children in a more livable way. The saddest teachers, Smith tells us, are those who never appreciate the difference between formal curricular goals and the only goal of any phenomenological significance, namely, learning to live together in the house of being, which is language itself (Smith, 1983a).

The middle way. This last line derives from Heidegger's assertion that to reflect on language means to dwell in language as an abode for humanity. Smith (1983a) understands "abode" as a place where one lives; in its earlier Anglo-Saxon form, as meaning to speak in order to reach an abode, a home. Such speaking takes us "in the middle of things," that place "between" human beings as mortals and the voice of language itself, the *logos*. Smith observes, with Heidegger, that language is where we live, our abode. Authentic human speaking is original, nonreproducible, and unfinished. Smith (1983a) worries that educators' language has been alienated from lived experience to such a degree that the art of hearing profound messages and calls, uttered in the midst of our teaching, has been lost. The alienation of language reduces all our doing and all our speaking to power negotiations which stifle and suffocate teachers and students alike. If we are to live at all, Smith tells us, if we are to speak phenomenologically, we must learn how to allow the voice of language itself to speak through us. To speak authentically represents a returning home to the abode where we educators may truly live again. Living in language, in the power of language itself to shape us and mold us, is for Smith the only authentic living. Phenomenological pedagogy might allow us to live together with the young in the house of being.

Another instance of the phenomenological reformulation of mainstream curricular language can be found in Aoki's (1993a) *In the Midst of Slippery Theme-Words: Toward Designing Multicultural Curriculum*. Conventional curriculum design was a pseudoscientific term serving the bureaucratic function of program planning [see chapter 13], but he locates the problem of curriculum design in poetical, not in bureaucratic, language. Aoki (1993a) asks:

Can designers of Japanese Canadian curricula . . . participate in the creation of a minority curriculum language that, I believe, only minorities can speak and understand? Such a language would be, I suspect, neither the language of the dominant culture nor the Japanese language of our heritage, but one that grows in the middle. (p. 99)

Here the great phenomenologist is moving toward poststructuralism while still profoundly grounded in the lifeworld.

Clearly, to work phenomenologically is to dwell with language in ways so that the problems of the everyday world become different problems, and the classroom becomes a different reality. Indeed, to enter phenomenological language is to become a different reality oneself. However, phenomenological study changes not only oneself; it changes the world. In contemporary phenomenology, hermeneutics has expressed explicitly such political and social themes.

IV

Hermeneutics: Smith, Atkins, Reynolds, Martel and Peterat

Hermes and I found each other, I suspect, because of a mutual recognition that identity means nothing without a set of relations, and that the real work of our

time may be defined by an ability to mediate meaning across boundaries and differences, whether those boundaries and differences be concerned with gender, race, or ideas.

(David G. Smith, 1991a, p. 203)

The coupling of . . . "play" and "hermeneutics" is meant to indicate that there is a deep natural affinity between the phenomenon of play and the character of hermeneutic understanding.

(David W. Jardine, 1988d, p. 23)

Hermeneutics involves the study of the methodological principles of interpretation. It recalls the Greek god Hermes, who was the interpreter, and so the creator of language, between mortals and the gods. The "hermeneuticist" is such a messenger, as she or he labors to interpret other texts, often ancient, sometimes sacred, for our understanding in the present. Hermeneutics has a long history, especially in theology [see chapter 12]. Hermeneutical problems have preoccupied philosophers as well as theologians, and in the present century, have become important for social scientists and literary critics as well as curriculum theorists. In phenomenological curriculum study, hermeneutics has functioned to enlarge the phenomenological endeavor to include the social negotiation of meaning, as well as individual attunement to truth.

For example, in his "Hermeneutic Inquiry: The Hermeneutic Imagination and the Pedagogic Text," David G. Smith (1991a) locates hermeneutics in society, suggesting "a link between social trouble and the need for interpretation" (p. 188). The hermeneutical task is not a technical one, solved by logic; rather, it is born in the midst of human struggle and enables us to ask "what makes it possible for us to speak, think, and act in the ways we do." Smith sees the aim of interpretation not in an infinite regress or relativization "but human freedom, which finds its light, identity, and dignity in those few brief moments when one's lived burdens can be shown to have their source in too limited a view of things" (p. 189). Further, the significance of the hermeneutic imagination may be to "to problematize the hegemony of dominant culture in order to engage it transformatively" (p. 195). In the phenomenological discourse on hermeneutics, phenomenology becomes explicitly political: "Pedagogy is concerned with mobilizing the social conscience of students into acts of naming and eradicating the evils of the times" (p. 196).

What is implied by the study of hermeneutics? Smith (1991a) tells us that we must work to grasp a sense of how language works, what drives it, what are its predispositions in terms of metaphor, analogy, structure, and so on. Such understanding of the history and dynamics of language is necessary for the work of the interpretive imagination, because in a deep sense our language contains the story of who we are as a people: "It is reflective of our desires, our regrets, and our dreams; in its silences it even tells us of what we would forget" (p. 199). Smith understands hermeneutics not "as another self-defining imploding discourse within a universe of other discourses. Far more important is its overall interest in the question of human meaning and of

how we might make sense of our lives in such a way that we can go on" (p. 200). Odd in light of his earlier criticism of *currere*, Smith (1991a) closes with a brief autobiographical statement, recognizing that all

writing is in a sense autobiographical. . . . Hermes and I found each other, I suspect, because of a mutual recognition that identity means nothing without a set of relations, and that the real work of our time may be defined by an ability to mediate meaning across boundaries and differences, whether those boundaries and differences be concerned with gender, race, or ideas. (Smith, 1991a, pp. 202-203)

Our singular identities will always and only be a part of the story, he cautions, unless we can reinterpret the presence of an Other, a presence that is always a part "of the story of our shared future" (p. 203).

Elaine Atkins (1988a) has also discussed a reframing of curriculum in terms of hermeneutics. She explained: "The hermeneutic tradition focuses on knowledge as a coping-with, rather than as a mirroring-of, reality and defines understanding as a form of practical reasoning and practical knowledge" (p. 437). Noting that Hans-Georg Gadamer was Heidegger's most important successor, and that Richard Rorty (1979, 1989) and Richard Bernstein (1976) have been two of this tradition's most influential American interpreters, Atkins (1988a) summarized:

Hermeneutical phenomenology depends upon the concepts of historical consciousness, phronesis, dialogue, interpretation, community, and language. Heidegger, Gadamer and Rorty all share a belief in the historicity of human life and cultures and in the rootedness of truth, knowledge, and morality in traditions and social practices. (p. 438)

So framed, "understanding can never be bracketed or separated from a concrete cultural/social situation" (p. 439), as quantitative social science attempts to do. "The goal is not," Atkins (1988a) continued, "a commensuration of theories, but, in Heidegger's words, 'finding a footing,' or, in Wittgenstein's, 'finding one's way about'" (p. 439). Human understanding, then, occurs in actual, lived situations. Understanding comes through language within a tradition: "In Gadamer's account, phronesis is a form of reasoning, concerned with choice and involving deliberation" (p. 442). For Atkins, then, hermeneutics leads the curriculumist back to Schwab who, as you will recall, was also influenced by hermeneutics. Atkins (1988a) asserts: "hermeneutics leads us to reframe curriculum theory in terms of practice, deliberation, and choice" (p. 447). Atkins (1988b) concludes: "To a field that has always been concerned with moral choice, scientific method, and aesthetic sensibility, the pragmatic-hermeneutical approach to understanding has much to offer" (p. 83).

Brent Davis (1994a, 1994b) hermeneutically investigates the teaching of mathematics, drawing upon biology, ecological thought, and mathematics as well as phenomenology. He employs metaphors and images of post-Darwinian evolutionary theory as starting places to interrogate the taken-for-

granted conceptions of personal cognition, social interaction, and collective knowledge which give form to conventional mathematics teaching. Davis' work develops around the notion of "mathematics teaching as listening," and its centerpiece is a phenomenology of listening that invokes Merleau-Ponty's conception of our "double embodiment" (i.e. our bodies are simultaneously biological and lived phenomenological structures) to critique and offer an alternative to patterns of teaching action that are founded on more isolated and fragmented conceptions of the subject.

Reynolds' phenomenological hermeneutics. In another hermeneutical study, William M. Reynolds (1989) presented an analysis of conservative and critical traditions in curriculum theory, employing a method developed by Paul Ricoeur (1981) for reading literary texts. The conservative texts Reynolds chose were *Nation at Risk* (NCEE) and *The Paideia Proposal* (Adler, 1983). The two examples of the critical tradition were Pinar's *Sanity, Madness, and the School* (1975a) and Apple's "Curricular Form and the Logic of Technical Control" (1982d). Reynolds' analysis moves from a naive reading to explanation to understanding, a sequence suggested by Ricoeur. With Gadamer, Reynolds suggests that prejudicial understandings cannot be eliminated in encountering texts, but that the reader should be willing to listen to the text to determine what is new.

From a naive reading Reynolds proceeds to the explanation phase. Here texts are explicated according to composition, genre, and style (Reynolds, 1989, pp. 84-89). In this phase resides the crucial step between a naive reading and an in-depth understanding. A structural analysis of the texts functions as the objective validation procedure. The third phase of the reading is a process of appropriation and self-understanding. This phase is made possible only due to mediation, different for each reader. Reynolds believes that theoretical texts, like words of fiction, posit possible worlds in which the self can be clarified, where the reader might dwell. Reynolds (1989) states that:

the authentic "I" or the "I" that I really am becomes in essence clarified. Through the recognition of the "not-I" of the text world and my reflection on the disparity between the "not-I" of the text world and the appearance of that to the self I am able to, by recognition of the "not-I," further distinguish my authentic self. (p. 127)

Reynolds concludes his study discussing the use of metaphoric language. He suggests that it might be useful to reflect on curriculum theory as story, fable, or parable. What began as a study of language and self-understanding concludes with an emphasis on language, suggesting new directions for curriculum theory, directions which intersect not only with Aoki's work, but with the emphasis upon narrative found in Clandinin, Connelly, and Goodson [see chapter 10].

In keeping with the Ricoeurian project, as we noted, the Reynolds' study is a documentary of the growth of self-understanding which emerges from a fusion of horizons with the texts. A perceptive review of the book summa-

rizizes the major issues Reynolds (1989) elaborates. David Kennedy (1991) wrote:

As such, [Reynolds' book] is a personal testament about one sensitive man's journey through the bleak, confusing, and emotionally exhausting terrain of most contemporary educational practice, and the capacity of curriculum theory to help him understand this journey. The personal level of the text is a reflection on the author's search for self among the barbaric, soul-murdering constraints of the typical classroom, where he spent nine years, and then among the "powerful and attractive voices" of the academy, where he shares with the reader his struggle not to lose his own voice. This is a major subtext of the book. . . . It is a story about a serious academic's quest to find his own critical voice and in finding his own critical voice, to find his identity. (p. 160)

Finding one's own voice is, hermeneutically speaking, a public quest, involving questions of theory and practice, a dualism that disappears in phenomenological hermeneutics. Aoki (1984a, 1989c) has pointed to this hermeneutical development:

One of the promising reunderstandings of "practice" views practice as *praxis*, wherein even the notion of theory requires a reunderstanding. I see at this time two major interpretations of *praxis*—one, in tune with the critical social theory of the neo-Marxist persuasion, and the other, hermeneutic *praxis* which seems to flow out of the existential posture of Heidegger and Gadamer. I note that at this cutting edge, forceful work is ongoing. (1986a, p. 4)

Aoki (1984a, 1989c) formulates a view of *praxis* that offers an existential view of thought-full-of-action and action-full-of-thought. For Aoki, reflection requires probing beneath language and action to the motives and assumptions that underlie them: "Reflection is not only oriented toward making conscious the unconscious by discovering underlying assumptions and intentions, but it is also oriented toward the implications for action guided by the newly gained consciousness and critical knowing" (1984a, p. 77). As Robert K. Brown (1991), a student of Aoki's contribution, has noted: "For Aoki, to be alive is to dwell in tension. It is to be aware and open to the anxiety that exists in venturing forth into new frontiers of existence and to use that tension as a compelling force for creative interaction with the world" (p. 71).

We can see, then, that hermeneutics as the study of interpretation moves between the individual in society and the world in the text. In curriculum, hermeneutics is the site of political, social, and institutional interests of the effort to understand curriculum as phenomenological text. This interest is reflected in a series of other studies, whose titles illustrate the range of the discourse. For instance, in his "Questioning Curriculum Implementation: Scenes From a Conversation," Terrance R. Carson (1992b) studied curriculum implementation as a hermeneutical process. In the field of home economics, Francine Hultgren (1985) reported "A Hermeneutic Approach: Reflecting on the Meaning of Curriculum through Interpretation of Student-Teaching Experiences in Home Economics." Reynolds (1993) explored the meaning of compassion. Shigeru Asanuma (1986a) underlined intentionality,

reflection, and intersubjectivity in understanding curriculum, noting that phenomenology allows aesthetic and ethical dimensions to be explored. Given this view of curriculum, other hermeneutical scholars have turned to social and political issues, including race (Barber, 1989, p. 228), the street children of Latin America (Aptekar, 1989), and sexism (Martel & Peterat, 1988). This topic we examine next.

Two studies of sexism underline the differences between political and feminist theory and phenomenological-hermeneutical scholarship that focuses on political and gender issues. In their "A Hope for Helplessness: Womanness at the Margin in Schools," Angeline Martel and Linda Peterat (1988) write: "Women are marginalized . . . marginality is a hope for social transformation" (p. 132). In an earlier article on the same subject, Martel and Peterat (1988) located sexism in language. It is language which shapes consciousness and embodies in us a particular view of the world. Martel and Peterat reconceived the feminist question: what do we do about the power which language commands of our lives? They answered: "Action is needed, but consciousness must precede, a more and more limpid, crystalline consciousness rejoining our language with our being" (p. 18). In addition to textual interpretation, hermeneutics has become a social, political form of contemporary phenomenological curriculum theory.

Such an agenda for phenomenology and hermeneutics was suggested by Dennis Carlson [see chapter 5] early in the 1980s: "Schooling involves learning the particular modes of being-in-the-world which sustain a fundamentally conservative conception of the individual and his or her relation to the larger society and act to preserve rather than challenge existing capitalist structures and social relations" (1982c, p. 207). Hermeneutical phenomenology is not usually associated with struggles against sexism or homelessness. With what category is it most commonly associated? Probably the notion of pedagogy or teaching is the best-known theme of contemporary phenomenology.

V

Teaching: Aoki and van Manen

Persons whose lives are embedded in gratitude for the gift of life and its possibilities can use conversation to share insights acquired in solitude, to transcend the mundane and humdrum and to become more caring human beings.

(Louise Berman, 1991, p. 138)

Teaching is fundamentally a mode of being.

(Tetsuo Aoki, 1986b, p. 8)

Phenomenologists insist that teaching is an orientation toward being. In a fundamental sense, such teaching is an "engagement of self-reflection." The teacher's phenomenological relationship to his or her subject matter is not to a field as objectified knowledge but to the possibilities inherent in subject matter for phenomenological knowing (Silvers, 1984). A distinction between teaching as "doing" and teaching as "being" is observed. A focus upon the

latter permits the teacher to understand that how he or she experiences not only subject matter but students, colleagues, and even himself or herself. All of these relationships are communicated to and learned by the students during the lived experience of teaching (Cunningham, 1979). Van Manen insists that "pedagogy is neither a question of process nor an issue of content. . . . [Pedagogy] constantly and powerfully operates in between" (van Manen, 1988, pp. 444, 446).

Aoki (1984a, 1984b, 1984c) has criticized educators who view the notion of "practice" as synonymous with that of "technique" and associate "competence" with that of instrumental action. Lost in the efficiency-based curriculum world is the lived-world of teachers and students. Curriculum-as-plan is the world of educational administrators and curriculum designers. Teachers are seen as officials. Such a view, Aoki insists, forgets "what matters deeply in the situated world of the classroom is how the teachers' 'doings' flow from who they are. . . . Teaching is fundamentally a mode of being" (1986b, p. 8). Juxtaposed to curriculum-as-plan is that of curriculum-as-lived-experience. Aoki contends that for a teacher to dwell in such a state is to dwell "in the zone of between" (1986b, p. 9). Dwelling between the horizon of curriculum-as-plan and the horizon of curriculum-as-lived-experience, the teacher is asked to listen to both simultaneously: "This is the tensionality within which [a teacher] dwells" (1986b, p. 9). Aoki writes:

An educated person, first and foremost, understands that one's way of knowing, thinking, and doing flow from who one is. Such a person knows that an authentic person is more than a mere individual, an island unto himself or herself, but a being-in-relation with others and hence is, at core, an ethical being. (1988b, pp. 8-9)

An educated person, Aoki continues, "guards against disembodied forms of knowing, thinking, and doing that reduce self and others to things, but also strives . . . for embodied thoughtfulness that makes possible living as human beings (1990a, p. 114). Finally, an educated person enters the pedagogical relationship by acknowledging humbly "the grace by which educator and educated are allowed to dwell in a present that embraces past experiences and is open to possibilities yet to be" (1990a, p. 114). One must "be ever open to the call of what it is to be deeply human and, heeding that call, to walk with others in life's ventures" (1990a, p. 114). Aoki's lyrical and insightful evocation of teaching is phenomenological scholarship at its best.

A lived relation between adults and children. Max van Manen, the other major phenomenologist, views the point of research as orienting its readers pedagogically to children. The Dutch phenomenologist Langeveld likened research to a puzzle, each research report carrying the caption: "can you find the child?" Van Manen agrees, and he worries that much research functions to cut off the "ordinary" relations adults have with children. Conventional research tends to objectify children, converting them into categories and jargon. Phenomenological research takes as its task the restoration of the

“ordinary” or “lived” relation, a relation, van Manen says, which might involve a “biographic seeing of the child’s experience.” For instance, van Manen describes a child skipping rope in this way:

I see a child skipping rope in the street, and I pause and smile. I see a youthful bounce, the commanding rhythm of a rope—and perhaps a memory. I recognize this rhyme. Times do not change. When the child stops, I still feel the snap against my feet. Regret fills me. I wish I could revisit the old school playground. But then I come to myself. My childhood place is thousands of kilometers away. It is not likely I would see it again as I knew it. I turn away from that child and resume my walk. I saw a child, a rope, a game. Sight and sound collaborated to make me feel the rope against my feet. Then I saw regret, nostalgia. Then I went on my way. (Van Manen, 1986 in 1988, p. 439)

Van Manen’s phenomenological description. The biographic seeing is incomplete, however, omitting the child’s experience. How would that experience be understood phenomenologically? The phenomenological curriculumist might describe how the child’s body feels as he or she skips, the texture of the rope, the feel of the air, the rhythms of skipping songs, the sensation of the ground, and the experience of others skipping and turning the rope. The teacher will see the student via the pedagogical relationship the teacher has with him or her. Van Manen describes a teacher’s “eye,” i.e. a pedagogical seeing, phenomenologically:

The teacher sees Diane skipping rope. He sees much more than a passerby can see, for he has known her for more than a year. She skips away from the other children, and he wonders what it will take for Diane to become one of them. She is academically the best achiever of her class, but her achievements are not the product of some irrepressible raw intelligence. Diane earns her accomplishments with a grim fervor that saddens the teacher. She has an overachieving mother who fosters ambitious goals. Diane’s mother intends to have herself a gifted daughter. Diane complies. She earns her mother’s favor, but at the price of childhood happiness, her teacher thinks. As he sees her skipping, he observes her tenseness and contrasts it with the relaxed skipping of the others. It is the same tenseness that betrays her anxiety with every assignment, every test. Diane marches rather than skips through the hoop of the rope. The teacher also sees how Diane’s eyes are turned to a half dozen girls who skip together with a big skipping rope. One of the girls returns her glance and gestures for Diane to come. Diane abruptly stops. The rope hits her feet and she turns toward the school door. What does the teacher see? A lonely girl who can relate to classmates only by constantly measuring herself by competitive standards. If only she could develop some personal space, some room to grow and develop social interests just for herself, away from her mother. The teacher is hopeful, for in Diane’s eyes he has spotted desire—a desire to be accepted by her classmates. (Van Manen, 1986 in 1988, p. 440)

From the singular to the universal and back again. Van Manen alleges that graduate study steeped in traditional curriculum thought and research tends to lead the sensitive pedagogue away from the sensitivity and insight evident in the above observation, away from concrete knowing to an abstraction

from, and categorization of, the "lived world." "Where," van Manen asks, "is the connection [in conventional graduate study in curriculum] with the everyday lifeworld which . . . used to be invested with a pedagogic interest (p. 441)?" Further, van Manen alleges that the cult of the practical (conventionally understood as efficiency, not as portrayed by fellow phenomenologist David Smith) results in a confusion of what is possible with what is desirable. Phenomenological pedagogical theory begins with the single case, moves to the universal, and returns to the single instance. Van Manen (1988) postulates four conditions as necessary for what he terms a "pedagogical textuality," what might be described as a curriculum true to the lifeworld of those who attempt to teach and study it. First, the text (or curriculum) must be *oriented*. That is, the educator must self-consciously examine how he or she "observes, listens, and relates to children" (p. 449). The phenomenological educator develops an orientation that is "reflexive" and "ontological," meaning that theory is inseparable from life as lived. If we are researchers, van Manen emphasizes, we must be researchers oriented to the classroom in a pedagogical way. Second, the text must be *strong*. The educator uses his orientation as a resource for constructing pedagogical understandings and he or she strengthens this resource in the very practice of pedagogy and research. Thus the educator does not treat his teaching as one approach among many. Van Manen quotes Nietzsche on this point: "Every strong orientation is exclusive" (quoted in Van Manen, 1988, p. 450). Third, the text must be *rich*. "The educator who is oriented in a strong way to the world of real children develops a fascination with real life" (p. 450). Such a fascination allows for and produces multiple meanings of events, meanings explored with children via anecdote, story, and other forms of phenomenological description. Fourth, the text must be *deep*. van Manen quotes Merleau-Ponty to make this point: "Depth is the means that things have to remain distinct, to remain things, while not being what I look at present" (quoted in van Manen, 1988, p. 451). Rich descriptions lay bare "meaning structures" beyond what is experienced in sensory and immediate ways.

In a more recent work, van Manen (1991) employs a notion of "tact." In his *The Tact of Teaching: The Meaning of Pedagogical Thoughtfulness*, van Manen (1991) lists a number of qualities of pedagogical thoughtfulness. For instance, he tells us that phenomenological pedagogy is sensitive to the context of life stories. Further, it asks us to reflect on children's lives. What is the meaning of the notion of "tact?" He tells us that tact means the practice of being oriented to others; to be tactful is to "touch" someone. He goes on to elaborate: tact preserves a child's space, protects what is vulnerable, prevents hurt, make whole what is broken, strengthens what is good, enhances what is unique, sponsors personal growth and learning. How does pedagogical tact do what it does? He answers that tact is mediated through speech, silence, the eyes, gesture, atmosphere, and example. Tact, van Manen (1991) continues, gives new and unexpected shape to unanticipated situations, and in so doing, leaves a mark on the child. As he has not in earlier works, van Manen added a section in the final chapter on "the relation between pedagogy and

politics" and notes: "Thus, pedagogical tact requires of us a certain worldliness, and the moral fibre to stand up for political views in which we believe" (p. 213). [For one discussion of tact, see Rudd, 1993.]

Hope and stability. Another theme of phenomenological research on teaching is that of hope and stability. In one study we are told that:

curriculum workers need to appreciate this hope/stability tension as a central feature in the lifeworlds of teachers. It is central to understanding how teacher agency completes a curriculum invention—that shapes its potential at the point where the invention [such as computer-assisted instruction] is brought from the outside, as abstraction, to the inner and social fabric of practice. Consequently, the notion of hope/stability may be central to our understanding how curriculum forms change and how they persist (Parker, 1986a, p. 30).

In another study, Margaret Olson (1989) discussed "making the classroom one's own, implying a search for comfort" (p. 178). The phenomenologist looks not for the efficient employment of classroom resources but rather to questions regarding "the nature of pedagogical space" (p. 178). Olson (1989) explains:

It is a shared space. The contents of the room hold personal meaning for all who inhabit it. . . . The presences of teacher and students pervade the space, not as isolated individuals, but as a mingling of thoughts and actions, each enhanced by the other. (p. 183)

Lived meaning. Another phenomenological theme points to lived meaning, and teaching as dwelling in the lived. What does this mean? Mikio Fujita (1987) answers:

First, lived experience is characterized by immediacy, vividness, or presentness, in which there is no separation into subject and object. Secondly, lived experience is a unit as a whole; it has already an articulated structure. Thirdly, lived experience always has the sense of lasting importance and significance. Lived meaning is what can be remembered vividly, even in the future, with its impact and import, even though the precise interpretation of the original experience may change through time. (pp. 4-5)

Fujita (1987) explains: "Lived meaning is the voiceless voice, unheard cry, speechless words, shapeless expressions, that is growing in the experience of a person. . . . Dialogue is the soil of lived meaning" (p. 15). In such a view, what is childhood?

Childhood is not an underdeveloped adulthood, perhaps like summer is not an underdeveloped autumn. . . . It seems far more important to foster lived meaning of ourselves and others even in a seemingly "primitive" stage than trying to run up the steps of developmental stages. I wish to call such a study of lived meaning semiogenetics. (Fujita, 1987, p. 18)

In his studies of teaching, David Jardine (1988c) points to the importance "of waiting, listening, attending" (p. 298). In a view of teaching influenced by Heidegger [see also Gotz, 1983], Jardine (1988a) writes:

The children all around us, then, are not given objects with certain properties, but persons about whom and with whom we must decide how to live our lives. . . . This is the sphere of practical understanding, the sphere of living our lives together with children and thoughtfully asking after what is best for them and for us, deciding . . . what should we do? (p. 185)

How does mainstream teacher education look in light of this view? David Smith (1988b) comments:

The most remarkable thing about contemporary North American teacher education may be that, in the name of concern for children, we have banished children . . . under a dense cover of rationalistic, abstract discourses about cognition, development, achievement, etc. (p. 175)

In another phenomenologically inspired effort to rethink teacher education, Basil Favaro (1981) suggested *Recasting a Program in Teacher Education from a Critical Perspective*. However, Favaro does not intend Marxism by the use of the concept of critical: "By 'critical' is meant bringing from concealment that which is implicit, disclosing what is usually taken for granted in such a way that what is hidden becomes significant." Favaro (1981) draws on Habermas, but his proposal does "not suggest abandoning the objectivist and hermeneutic levels" (p. 1). Indeed, for Favaro to be critical means to be phenomenological.

Ceremonies, celebrations, and atmosphere. As we have noted, phenomenologists often do not concern themselves with taken-for-granted bureaucratic matters. Indeed, at times phenomenological themes seem rather far apart from those traditionally associated with the school as institution. The scholarship of Otto Bollnow is illustrative.

In reflecting on ceremonies and celebrations in the school, Otto Bollnow (1989d) suggests: "ceremonies and celebrations are not just minor matters; rather, they prove the Heideggerian thesis that the primary unlocking of the world is found fundamentally only by way of *pure moods*" (p. 64). [For a different view of school ritual, see Lesko, 1988a.] What is it about ceremonies and celebrations that might allow the experience of pure moods? Bollnow (1989d) explains: "A typical feature of festive celebration is extravagance and boisterousness. People feel themselves freed from and lifted above the limiting structures of everyday life" (p. 72). Once released from the taken-for-granted limits of everyday life, one is free to explore:

If wandering can make claim to great . . . pedagogical significance, then it is given this meaning through deep, far-reaching changes and rejuvenations of consciousness which the person experiences in wandering and which are similar in some ways to the experiences of festive celebrations. (p. 74)

Bollnow (1989a) has also written on the notion of "pedagogical atmosphere," by which he means "all those fundamental emotional conditions and sentient human qualities that exist between the educator and the child and which form the basis for every pedagogical relationship" (p. 5). In discussing

the pedagogical atmosphere from the point of view of the educator, Bollnow (1989c) points to what he terms educational love (which is neither eros nor charity), a notion which incorporates patience, hope, serenity, humor, and finally, goodness: "goodness does not relax the situation by lowering the demands; instead, it accompanies the other, especially the younger and more vulnerable person, with a requirement of strictness and a sensitive watchfulness" (p. 62). Writing of the pedagogical atmosphere from the perspective of the child, Bollnow (1989b) notes: "These impulses of a child's trust require special and cautious care, even when, from the perspective of the adult, these impulses appear excessive, for this trust is truly a foundation that must exist if the child is to develop properly" (p. 15). Trust is essential to the educational process "for there is a lasting significance of the atmosphere of security and cheerfulness" (p. 16). In a pedagogic relationship of trust Bollnow (1989b) tells us, there is the sense of "morningness" (p. 22). He concludes: "But as Goethe saw so sharply, awe and respect come to the person not from within, but rather it is carefully nurtured through a long and protracted process of education and socialization" (pp. 34-35).

Another interesting example of phenomenological scholarship on teaching is a conversation among five educators regarding *Education for Being*. Ted Aoki recounts, in his preface to the book (Berman, et al., 1991), that the title—"Education is Being"—is recorded on a banner mounted outside the Institute for Education of the University of Heidelberg, Germany. Aoki writes:

For myself, these voices do not blend in a closure; rather, they celebrate openness to openness—there is distinct resistance on their part to be brought to a closure. I liken these five voices not to a symphonic harmony of oneness, but, as in certain Bach fugues, to a polyphony of five lines in a tensionality of contrapuntal interplay, a tensionality of differences. (Aoki, in Berman, et al., 1991, p. xiii)

Among the themes of this book are: toward curriculum for being; the person as significant, education as journey, language as meaning, knowledge as personally constructed, and the teacher as pilgrim. The hermeneutical process is evident in the conversation among the participants. Francine tells her listeners: "My knowing has been revealed in my power to be" (p. 16). Mary: "I do not completely understand this text I teach, but there seem to be some irreducibles: an elemental belief in freedom, a desire for grace, and a yearning for community" (p. 67). Jessie: "Whatever characterizes the next detour I take or the next pictures I find within, I feel certain that music will continue to be an accompaniment that helps bring together the internal (self) and external (others) aspects of my life" (p. 91). Diane: "Looking back I see that it has always been in connection with others that I am transformed. . . . I am a woman defined within relationships; relationships that I care about and, therefore, that constitute me" (p. 115). Louise: "Persons whose lives are embedded in gratitude for the gift of life and its possibilities can use conversation to share insights acquired in solitude, to transcend the

mundane and humdrum and to become more caring human beings" (p. 138). The increasing political sensitivity of phenomenology is evident in a postscript:

We have an ethical concern related to Heidegger (quoted often in this book). In the process of our inquiry we became aware that his political affiliations and activities were incompatible with his concern for Being. We abhor his politics. We share his expressed concern for Being. This issue confirms the value of a group such as ours which created a space for us to ponder the tensions in people's lives. (p. 190)

Phenomenological scholarship on teaching invites you to teach as a mode of relation to yourself, to others, to subject matter. A contemplative and meditative self-reflexivity is required, as the quoted passages above imply. In the phenomenological world, modes of being rather than sets of behavioral skills characterize the effort to understand curriculum and teaching. Unsurprisingly, phenomenologists have also explored reading and writing as meaningful ways of being in the world, not as sets of behavioral skills. To reading and writing we turn next.

VI

Reading and Writing: Grumet, Hunsberger, van Manen

A text speaks to us in a manner that shows us how we are in the world.
(Max van Manen, 1985, p. 22)

In phenomenology the concern is to understand . . . what difference reading makes in our lives.
(Margaret Hunsberger, 1988, p. 211)

Writing is the substance of education.
(Alan A. Block, 1988, p. 47)

A phenomenology of reading requires returning that activity to the subjectively embodied person (Greene, 1974, 1975b; Grumet, 1988a). Grumet employed Merleau-Ponty's concept of "body subject" to rescue reading from a dualistic and idealistic epistemology. "Bodyreading" is Grumet's concept for embodied reading, an act which requires what Ricoeur termed "sense" and "reference," i.e. what one knows and how one lives. "Sense" refers to the "what" of the text. "Reference" is "what the text is about." Ricoeur employed these categories to repudiate idealism, what Sartre described as taking the word for the world. We are "in the world," influenced by situation and influencing situations. "Bodyreading," Grumet (1988a) explains, "is strung between the poles of our actual situation, crowded as it is with our intentions, assumptions, and position, and the possibilities that texts point to" (p. 455).

Mainstream reading research and instruction is "decentered," guilty of idealism, obsessed with procedure and protocol, seemingly unaware that all

symbolic systems, including language, are aspects of lived worlds [see Heap, 1980]. Merleau-Ponty maintained that:

words, vowels, and phonemes are so many ways of "singing" the world, and their function is to represent things not, as the naive onomatopoeic theory had it, by reason of objective resemblance, but because they extract, and literally express, their emotional essence (quoted in Grumet, 1988a, p. 455).

Like language, curriculum is a "moving form," according to Grumet (1988a) "conceived as an aspiration, the object and hope of our intentionality, it comes to form and slips, at the moment of its actualization, into the ground of our action" (p. 455). It is this movement which Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur recover for language and reading.

Bodyreading: A recovery of what is absent? A certain sadness is associated with bodyreading, Grumet (1988a) believes. The notion implies an integration and concreteness now lost, an idea consistent with Heideggerian phenomenology. Psychoanalytic theories of language also suggest this sense as they postulate desire as the precondition of symbol formation. Psychoanalytically then, to read, to write, indeed to speak and even to think, is to acknowledge the presence of an absence. Bodyreading may be such a concept, devised to recover what is absent; perhaps that is the mission of reading, phenomenologically conceived. As Jacques Lacan insists, language is a sign of estrangement, an expression of desire, predicated upon loss.

Grumet uses psychoanalytic and feminist theory to situate the reading debate between phonics and sight words. Grumet believes that in spite of the highly organized nature of phonics instruction (with its repetitious drill sequences), the recitation of sounds it requires is reminiscent of the echolalia that is the babble of infants. The highly inflected, immediately echoed preoedipal speech of mother and child is "the mother tongue," sounds which express intimacy without denotative meaning. Grumet (1988a) describes the differential course of speech development for boys and girls:

Girls, permitted to sustain the original identifications with their mothers, need not repress sound and touch as significant ways of being attached to the world. . . . To be male is to be, in effect, no mom, and that early identification as well as the sensual modalities that dominated it are repressed so that an identification with a father whose presence and relation depend more on sight than on sound or touch can be achieved. Surrendering the detail, the intimacy and texture that touch and sound provide, sight provides us with a view and privileges the structural relations of abstract and rational thought that accompany literacy. (p. 463)

The world as answer to the body's question. Grumet agrees with Merleau-Ponty that the world is the answer to the body's question: "One's own body is the term, always tacitly understood in the figure-background structure, and every figure stands out against the double horizon of external and bodily space" (quoted in Grumet, 1988a, p. 465). In this phenomenological sense the world arranges itself around our hopes, needs, and possibilities, real and

imagined. The meaning of a text is the possible and actual ground of thought and action; it is what the reader makes out of what she finds when she reads. Meaning in this sense is not *in* the text.

Grumet cites several projects which speak to the experience of reading. The Bay Area Writing Project and its associated projects appear to engage teachers in ways which bring attention to the experience of writing. Writing enables the reader to see the omissions, contradictions, and contingencies hidden or partially hidden in the text. The reader-response research done by David Bleich (1978) illustrates how students draw from their own store of associations to constructively read the text. In literary theory Terry Eagleton (1983) portrays a "writable" text, one characterized by what Barthes termed double signs, revealing their provisionality, materiality, and historicity. Eagleton explains:

The "writable text," usually a modernist one, has no determinate meaning, no settled signifiers, but is plural and diffuse, an inexhaustible tissue or galaxy of signifiers, a seamless weave of codes, and fragments of codes, through which the critic may cut his own errant path. There are no beginnings and ends, no sequences which cannot be reversed, no hierarchy of textual "levels" to tell you what is more or less significant. All literary texts are woven out of other texts, not in the conventional sense that they bear the traces of "influence" but in the more radical sense that every word, phrase or segment is a reworking of other writings which precede or surround the individual work. There is no such thing as literary "originality," no such thing as the "first" literary work: all literature is intertextual. A specific piece of writing thus has no clearly defined boundaries: it spills over constantly into the works clustered around it, generating a hundred different perspectives which dwindle to a vanishing point. The work cannot be sprung shut, rendered determinate, by an appeal to the author, for the "death of the author" is a slogan that modern criticism is now confidently able to proclaim. (Eagleton, quoted in Grumet, 1988a, pp. 467-468)

Intertextuality. While this view may seem extreme given many assumptions of mainstream English teachers, it does function theoretically to return texts to teachers and students. Intertextuality is an invitation to employ multiple texts, spliced, interwoven with commentary and question, all of which constitute the curriculum. Intertextuality is congruent with the word processor, not with "some video version of the questions at the end of the chapter, but the presentation of text that can disappear at the touch of the delete button" (Grumet 1988a, p. 468). Derrida's work speaks to the experience of reading also, in Grumet's view. Deconstructionism [see chapter 9] declares meaning an "alias," a false construction devised to disguise the plurality of meanings that is a text. For Derrida, meaning is provisional, lively, fluttering. For Roland Barthes (1975), it is sensual. The text is an invitation to pleasure, and reading is a multiple expression of intentionality.

To be with the one I love and to think of something else: this is how I have my best ideas, how I best invent what is necessary to my work. Likewise for the text, it produces in me the best pleasure if it manages to make itself heard indi-

rectly; if, reading it, I am led to look up often to listen to something else. I am not necessarily *captivated* by the text of pleasure; it can be an act that is slight, complex, tenuous, almost scatterbrained: a sudden movement of the head like a bird who understands nothing of what we hear, who hears what we do not understand. (Barthes, quoted in Grumet 1988a, pp. 468-469)

Margaret Hunsberger (1985a, 1985b, 1988, 1989, 1992) is perhaps the most prominent phenomenologist of reading. In her "The Time of Texts," Hunsberger (1992) criticizes mainstream conceptions of time as "segmented, invariant, and linear" (p. 64), noting that schooltime does not necessarily coincide with our experience of time as lived. To illustrate the lived experience of time while reading, Hunsberger converses with readers. Through this conversation she describes "entering the world of the text." Hunsberger concludes: "Reading gives us an opportunity to experience time in various ways, to start difficult but significant thinking, to glimpse not-time, and to stretch our imaginative limits" (p. 91). In an earlier study, Hunsberger (1985a), writing on the experience of rereading, tells us: "Rereading can be a way of moving ourselves forward, of deepening our understanding" (p. 161). Reflecting on oral reading she believes that what is essential to rereading occurs in readers' interaction and sharing, a point made as well by Grumet and Pinar (1992). In her study of "Students and Textbooks," Hunsberger (1989) notes: "The interpretation of text . . . is concerned fundamentally with the relationship between reader and text" (p. 115). However, reading is a fundamentally social process, and "in an interpretive community the teacher is spared the burden of always being right" (p. 125); students become more active and engaged. Reading has also been studied by Robert K. Brown (1991), who portrayed phenomenologically a remedial reading program in the context of a major study of Aoki and van Manen. On the teaching of English as second language, Angeline Martel (n.d.) wrote: "Perhaps E.S.L. should be based, not on hopes of equality, but on differences, in an effort to dwell in the uniqueness of the individual while giving him/her the tools to live in the larger community" (p. 10). [For another engaging study of E.S.L., see Sauv , 1991.] Understood phenomenologically, reading is an embodied being-in-the-world, with others.

Dennis Sumara (1992a, 1992b, 1993, 1994a, 1994b, in press) has worked to define a new location for curriculum theorizing by studying shared readings of literary texts. Situated in the hermeneutic phenomenological tradition, his work provides interpretations of the experience of reading within school contexts. Sumara wishes to render visible the largely invisible architecture of human/textual/contextual relations which emerge from the location announced by the presence of a literary text. His work has helped to discredit the idea of reading as *transaction* wherein literary meaning is conceptualized as a "third thing" existing between reader and text; rather, reading is understood as a form of "embodied action" whereby all of the constituent parts of a curriculum that include literary texts "coemerge" through their relations with one another. Sumara has described these

embodied curricular relations as a continually evolving interaction between "us/not-us."

When reading is so understood, it becomes clear that the literary text is not simply transposed onto already-existing relations. Instead the literary text, when included in the "not-us" world of the classroom in which the student and teacher must interact, influences and alters *all* of the existing curricular relations. In addition, these shared literary relations, he suggests, function as a type of literary anthropology where what the reader has to say about the literary text is far less interesting than what the literary text announces about the reader. For Sumara, then, the hermeneutic tradition of self-interpretation in relation to the lived experience of reading with others becomes a way to learn about the complexity of ever-evolving curricular relations.

Writing. Writing is experienced in distinctively phenomenological terms as well. Van Manen (1989), in his "By the Light of Anecdote," defends the anecdotal phenomenological tradition in which he situates his work: "For some, such as Strasser (1969), the products of the Utrecht School suffered from a lack of philosophical rigor or sophistication, thus yielding a soft, anecdotal form of phenomenology" (p. 233). Van Manen believes that the power of the anecdote concerns its capacity to amplify the phenomenological and hermenetic quality of human science text. Central to his interest is a methodological notion of seeing the process of human science research as intrinsically textual or a writing activity (van Manen, 1984a, 1984b, 1986, 1989). In fact, van Manen (1989) regards the "practice of research as a form of writing" (p. 237). He recalls Sartre, whom he regards as a phenomenologist "who stood and acted in the middle of the hustle and bustle of social and political life." For van Manen, "writing [is] thinking. . . . Writing is a kind of self-making or forming. To write is to measure the depth of things, as well to come to a sense of one's own depth" (p. 238). Invoking this example, van Manen lists five aspects of writing. First, "writing separates us from what we know, yet it unites us more closely with what we know" (p. 238). Second, van Manen notes that phenomenological "writing distances us from the lifeworld, yet it also draws us more closely to the lifeworld" (p. 239). Third, van Manen believes that "writing decontextualizes thought from practice and yet it returns thought to praxis" (p. 239). Fourth, "writing abstracts our experience of the world, yet it also concretizes our understanding of the world" (p. 240). Finally, van Manen notes that:

writing objectifies thought into print and yet it subjectifies our understanding of something that truly engages us. . . . The writing of the text is the research. Writing exercises the ability to see. . . . The methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology is more a carefully cultivated thoughtfulness than a technique. (pp. 240-241)

To further develop the notion of writing phenomenological thoughtfulness, van Manen defends the anecdote:

Anecdote can be understood as a methodological device in human science to make comprehensible some notion that easily eludes us. . . . [It is] analogous to the use of metaphor. Anecdotes are a special kind of story; they resemble mini-stories possessing a rhetorical quality that moves them more closely into the direction of *sayings* and *proverbs* on the one hand, and *poetic fragments* on the other hand. (p. 243)

"In the raindrop is the ocean" is an old saying the wisdom of which van Manen seems to share: "The paradoxical thing about anecdotal narrative is that it tells something particular while really addressing the general or the universal" (p. 247).

Phenomenological writing cannot be interested in purely hypothetical problems; it always derives from and returns to the world:

And so, because of the nature of its object of study—the pedagogical situation—phenomenological pedagogical research cannot be interested in its questions merely out of purely academic or intellectual curiosity. Pedagogy does not just want to know how things are; pedagogical research always has an inherent practical intent because sooner or later this knowledge figures in how one must act. (p. 250)

Finally, the power of anecdotes is that they resist escaping the world into abstraction: "anecdotes, like pedagogical situations, are always concrete and particular" (van Manen, 1989, p. 251).

Another instance of phenomenological scholarship in which writing is understood as not literal or technical is that of Minerva Lopez-Caples (1989), who suggested that "children fictionalize themselves first in play, then in oral storytelling, and in literate societies, through creative writing" (p. 101). Lopez-Caples (1989) believes that through play, storytelling, and writing, the child can reexperience him or herself as whole:

I believe that our first child-self . . . is one joyfully unconscious, loved and accepted, and nourished, centralized and attended to consistently, predictably, and eternally. As we begin to discover the contradictions between this internally contained reality and what actually happens to self in the world, anxiety and uncertainty develop. . . . This resolution [of this tension] we find . . . through a search for the achievement of self-knowledge. (p. 103)

It is through a return to origins that the child can heal: "In the imaginative act of self-fictionalization, the child probes for a kind of truth. . . . Eventually, he or she may discover . . . a personal memory of historical proportions. It will be then that he or she will glance up at the sky and see the sun and perhaps not be so afraid anymore" (p. 104). Reading and writing, then, are modalities of self-creation, self-understanding, and self-presentation in an intersubjective, layered, textured world. It is a world from which one might retreat from time to time, to find a secret place where the scale of things conforms more closely with one's intimate and private world. As we will see, this secret place is not only literal. One can be in the midst of people and activity and still be tucked safely away in one's secret place.

VII

The Secret Place: Langeveld and Smith

The playground is also a place for understanding what is happening to children. It is a child's place, a place for being able to act like a child, and a place for seeing what matters to children.

(Stephen J. Smith, 1988, p. 2)

In this section we will not only report Langeveld's fascinating exposition of the "secret place," but other phenomenological research which seeks to articulate those secret margins of lived experience, i.e. ordinarily inaccessible to the technical world of everyday institutional life. [For additional information regarding this influential Dutch pedagogical theorist, see van Manen, 1980]. Langeveld observed that children are not formed by the public world, including the school, alone. They are drawn, he wrote, by their own world. To create these worlds, a formal curriculum is not sufficient: "They also need freedom and openness to the beckoning of that which is as yet undetermined and uncertain." That which is undetermined and uncertain, that which is mysterious, constitutes the "secret place." The secret place is a physical place, but its importance resides in its function for the child. Here the child can withdraw from a public world he or she does not yet comprehend. Here he or she can think about that world, and perhaps observe it.

Solitude and safety. The secret place is characterized by indistinct boundaries. Indeed, the child may lose himself or herself in the experience of the secret place. Langeveld approves of this possibility, regarding it as complementary to a public world, especially the school, that is characterized by systematization, explicitness, and order. In contrast, the secret place is construed by fantasy and creative imagination. It is laced with qualities of a waking dream, a mood, a feeling that is evoked again and again, comforting the visitor and owner of the secret place. Words are often unnecessary. Speech is said to occur in the deep silence of an a priori understanding of self and place. The tone of voice may change into the tonality of intimacy. In the secret place the child finds solitude and safety. There the distinctions between outer and inner world may melt into a single, unique secret world of the child. Space, emptiness, and also darkness reside in the same realm; time seems to stand still, or else it disappears: both feel the same (Langeveld, 1983a, 1983b).

Langeveld asserts that we are lonely only in the world. In the reality of worlds we create we feel at home, grounded. In the secret place we feel no anxiety; all is protected. It represents a state of innocence, and contrasts sharply with the exactness and objectivity of the school class. In the secret place, in lived space, phenomena present themselves to the child with immediacy. Here the eidetic image, sensory illusions, and dream images intermingle with the physical attributes of the, say, attic. The body feels at home, not too small compared to adult bodies, not too slow compared to adult pace

and rhythm. Space is the right scale, as it is created by the occupant of the secret place. Langeveld believes that adults who are whole retain this sense of "secret place" because this sense conveys aspects of what is essentially human. As adults, however, the secret place is no longer so secret; ordinarily it is shared with loved ones: the home, the studio, the workshop, the neighborhood pub. Educators, too, must share a fundamental understanding of this indeterminate place and must not fall into the mistake of viewing the whole world as the institution of school. Much is to be learned outside of the school-world (Langeveld, 1983b).

As we indicated, the "secret place" is a figurative as well as literal concept. Figuratively speaking, another secret place can be the playground, outside the usual locus of institutional curriculum, the classroom. As Jardine (1988b) has noted: "Play can be understood . . . as the exploration of possible worlds of meaning" (p. 34). Possible worlds may contain hidden danger and the risk of injury that can accompany play. For another phenomenological scholar (Fischer, 1989), injury itself is a category of study. Others focus on the risk, not the injury. Stephen J. Smith (1988) discusses this risk on the playground:

Ignored by those for whom children are of little consequence or those who are too preoccupied with adult concerns to be much bothered with things that matter to children, taken for granted by those who take children for granted and prefer to see their effective removal from the adult world, the playground is also a place for understanding what is happening to children. It is a child's place, a place for being able to act like a child, and a place for seeing what matters to children. (p. 2)

Smith recalls a knock on his door by a neighborhood child, whose knocking, seeking a playmate, obligates him to look out for him. The neighborhood boy, Stephen, is asking:

not only for a response that is mindful of the dangers to which he is exposed, but for a response that is mindful of his being a child and of the obligation that this fact places on me as an adult. How should I respond? Whatever I do, I am already responsible for the risky texture of his life. (p. 5)

How does Smith frame his responsibility? "I help the child by being with him or her in such a way that risks are seen where, without my help, danger might lurk" (p. 9). From this deeply felt sense of responsibility for the child, Smith moves to a "secret place" of the playground: "Might I suggest that being present pedagogically has to do with encouraging the child with a mindfulness of how the child encounters the world. It has to do with seeing risk as the child may come to see it" (p. 11). Speaking to other teachers, Smith (1988) says:

we [must] care for the risky nature of their activity, their playground activity in particular, by reawakening to the world which the child sees. Helping and encouraging the child's efforts, becoming mindful of how the playground

appears, and seeking to make this activity a common encounter, are the determinants of this pedagogic atmosphere. These are the atmospheric conditions of our responsibility for children on playgrounds and the dimensions of our thinking about how children can learn to become responsible themselves for the riskiness of everyday life. (pp. 13-14)

In a similar study, Smith (1989) describes risk not as a negative attribute of children's playground activity, but more positively as those challenges and adventures to which children can actively respond:

Risk refers to something that is being accomplished by children, some intended activity which expands their sense of the world. . . . I present an understanding how we can bring an underlying sense of security to children's feelings for the playground and for the risks that can be taken there. (Smith, 1990, p. 71)

In another study, Smith (1989) reflects on his child undergoing heart surgery: "The important thing is that we attend to the child's experience and that we who are reflectively engaged in his daily life learn how to speak up for the child during his hospitalization" (p. 162). This statement—and Stephen Smith's work generally—is reminiscent of child-centered progressivism in the 1920s. Yet, it is expressed in language and communicates a worldview that is rather different. Not based in psychoanalysis or developmental psychology, Smith's attentiveness to the child is rooted in a phenomenological appreciation of the power of the parent-child bond, a bond that seems to have a mystical as well as a psychological content.

The notion of "secret place" is not only what is overlooked in the bustle of daily activity or a literal place children go, it can be a creative act of making some place hidden, making a secret. Reflecting on "creative concealment" among children and adolescents, Kenneth Stoddart (1989) asserted: "Indeed, in the presentation and preservation of a self, what is hidden is as crucial as what is revealed" (p. 163). He continued: "Indeed, it is the case that optimism regarding children's progress to competent adulthood can be generated by suspending interest in the *that* and *what* of their concealment and addressing instead the *locales* they choose" (p. 168). Sometimes the use of devices creates the insularity that makes for a secret place. Studying "The Walkman and the Primary World of the Senses," Rainer Schonhammer (1989) suggested:

an important aspect of the alteration in the subject-world-relationship of a Walkman user [is that] lived space loses its familiarity, [it] is somehow split into two. The familiar environment in which one lives and moves takes on a strange character when one is separated from the acoustic part of it. . . . [A] Walkman user [is] being present and absent at the same time. (pp. 133-134)

Whether in secret or public places, the phenomenological student is acutely aware of time. Time, however, is not that which is recorded on clocks and watchfaces. Rather, to be attuned to time is to reside in one's lived time, in one's lived space, an embodied temporality.

VIII

Temporality: Huebner and Lippitz

Human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizons of present.

(Dwayne E. Huebner, 1975c, p. 244)

A fundamental phenomenological concept and one which has received elaboration as a curricular concept is that of temporality. Dwayne Huebner first identified and explicated this concept's significance for understanding curriculum in 1967. Huebner relied on Heidegger's articulation of the concept. After rejecting "learning" as the key concept for curriculum, Huebner reconceived the field's interest in "purposes," "goals," and "objectives" as a concern for temporality (Huebner, 1975c). To explicate temporality, Huebner referred to Heidegger's *Being and Time*. For Heidegger time is a fundamental aspect of Dasein: "Dasein's totality of being as care means: ahead-of-itself-already-being-in (a world) as being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). . . . The 'ahead-of-itself' is grounded in the future. In the 'Being-already-in . . .,' the character of 'having been' is made known. 'Being-alongside' becomes possible in making present" (Heidegger, quoted in Huebner, 1975c, p. 243). Huebner (1975c) explained:

[The person] does not simply await a future and look back upon a past. The very notion of time arises out of man's [sic] existence, which is an emergent. The future is man facing himself in anticipation of his own potentiality for being. The past is finding himself already thrown into a world. It is the having-been which makes possible the projection of his potentiality. The present is the moment of vision when Dasein, finding himself thrown into a situation (the past), projects his own potentiality for being. Human life is . . . a present made up of a past and future brought into the moment. . . . Human life is never fixed but is always emergent as the past and future become horizons of present. Education recognizes, assumes responsibility for, and maximizes the consequences of this awareness of man's temporality. (p. 244)

For Huebner this responsibility or concern must take curricular forms which "make possible those moments of vision when the student, and/or those responsible for him, project his potentiality for being into the present, thus tying together the future and the past into the present" (Huebner 1975c, p. 246).

Pinar (1992b) drew upon Huebner's concern for temporality in his phenomenological meditation on death and dying. He wished to "write about death, our deaths. Death which can seem so distant, but which can be so close at hand. Indeed, death here and now, in the midst of lights and life" (p. 92). Acknowledging his father's death a few months before, Pinar (1992b) recalled those who have participated in the curriculum field in time past:

A thought, a field, a relationship is never ours alone; it is theirs as well. (Rugg is here, in imagination.) To "let me be" can mean to permit some space of separa-

tion, of solitariness, of freedom, but they will not let us be completely. Nor do or should we wish to be free of them, for they are our origins, their flesh is our flesh, and to be truly free of them, is to lose them, and to lose ourselves. Let me be, blessed spirit, but do not leave me. (p. 93)

Pinar went on to tell the story of Ingmar Bergman's 1972 film entitled "Cries and Whispers" in which a dying woman—the character's name is Agnes—comes alive the night after her death. Pinar noted:

A dead woman resurrects our hope. Through suffering and dying and witnessing, Agnes . . . comes to express hope and life. There is death and then there is resurrection. In life there are thousands of deaths and rebirths, and the embodied intellect seeks transcendence of its past and entries into its future. We can take courage and comfort from Agnes' story as it portrays life from death. (p. 98)

Pinar (1992b) concluded:

Just as those who have died before us whisper and cry as we speak our time, our place, ourselves, those who have not yet appeared and those who are appearing—our children—speak in our voices. Our children provoke our parenting, permitting us to reexperience our own childhood. . . . The very fact of children testifies to our dying and to their birthing and gives urgency and immediacy to our pedagogical relationships to them. . . .

Cries and whispers of the dead who live; cries and whispers of she who dies, who is resurrected, whose death testifies to life. A phenomenology of death might . . . enable us to affirm those who have gone before us, those who, like us, are dying now, and those children born and unborn who bring life to our dyings, all of us, past, present, future, blessed by death, blessed by life. (p. 100)

Piaget's and Langeveld's views of time. In another phenomenological study of temporality, German phenomenologist Wilfried Lippitz (1983) contrasted Jean Piaget's view of time with that of Dutch phenomenologist Langeveld, whose reflections on the notion of "secret place" we reviewed earlier. Lippitz observed that for Piaget the development of the concept of time in the child is a special instance of the general development of intelligence. Indeed, time cannot be said to exist for the child, Piaget believed, until the age of operative intelligence, except as it is experienced in action. Lippitz asserted that Piaget is conscious of the child's "prereflective" experience of time, but does not view this prereflective dimension as foundational to all modes of experience in the world. For Piaget, prereflective experience is noteworthy only insofar as it anticipates rational, cognitive development. The child's sense of time does not belong to the sphere of his characteristic representational activity. Time is an intellectual construct, valid always and everywhere, requiring the concept of constancy of the velocity of the measuring instruments. For Piaget, then, time is "clock" time (Lippitz, 1983). [Earlier in the chapter we summarized Jardine's analysis of Piaget's concept of self-understanding. Piaget's stature and influence as well as his scientific commitments make him of special interest to phenomenologists.]

For Langeveld time is not a cognitive structure in itself. Rather, time is a fundamental structure of the lifeworld. In prototypical phenomenological fashion, Langeveld suggests that the concept of time for the child involves the child's attempt to fit him or herself into the temporal schema erected by adults: the primary analog for time is a lived directedness toward that which is coming in the future. This experience of time has little to do with the clock. In the course of education adults gradually but inexorably superimpose this "measuring tape" of time on the phenomenological experience of the child. With the continual aid of adults, the life of the small child must adapt him or herself to the adult's mechanical temporal schemes. At an early stage the child experiences the adult situation of being bound by time. Langeveld insists, then, that the child experiences time profoundly, and in multiple forms. He identifies an experience of anticipation, an experience of the present, and an experience of the past. Fundamentally then, there is an experience of duration. The experience of lived time cannot be reduced to clock time (Lippitz, 1983).

Exemplary incidents. To describe lived (*gelebter*) and experienced (*erlebter*) time, Langeveld relies (like van Manen) on anecdotes which, in the phenomenological view, portray "exemplary" and "typical" incidents in which time is discernible. He then employs these incidents as occasions of understanding time for the child and as a fundamental structure of existence. A phenomenological method apprehends the fundamental structures of the lifeworld, such as time, from a distance, in this instance, from the memory of childhood. Memory must produce a precise observation and description, both of which are then examined intersubjectively, via conversation with others. This method avoids both mere replication of lifeworld processes and a complete reconstruction of those processes according to reestablished elements of consensual knowledge. The phenomenologist begins with lived contexts, as in the case of Langeveld's use of anecdote as the starting-point of his interpretation of time for the child. He does not resort to a pre-given, abstract definition of time. Indeed, the phenomenologist strives to begin and end in concreteness. But as wedded to concreteness as phenomenological understanding is, it, in Husserlian fashion, claims to represent general understanding of which the concrete is an instance, however essential an instance. Lippitz (1983) asserts that the structures of the lifeworld have a pre-personal, presubjective character. They are experienced personally, and reconstituted personally, in body and mind. Likewise, general structures of the lifeworld, such as time, in principle cannot be adequately grasped by concepts. These structures are prior to language. Language itself, including phenomenological description, is grounded in prepredicative, unthematized, lived processes.

Modes of waiting. Another temporal theme in phenomenological research is that of waiting. Reflecting on this theme, Mikio Fujita (1985) notes: "Waiting occupies a significant place in the experience of parents and educa-

tors. . . . Waiting is a far from trivial matter in our day-to-day pedagogic lives" (p. 107). Fujita suggests that there are two aspects or qualities of waiting: "what is waited for" (its explicitness may vary) and "how we wait" (whatever its hue and nuance may be)" (p. 108). We can see that we are far from a mechanical or clock-time world here. Instead we are in the lifeworld, where time is lived, i.e. experienced, not counted: "The notion that waiting is nothing but boredom is only pertinent to the mechanical world, whereas the opposite notion that waiting is vitally important is pertinent only to the world of becoming" (p. 113). Waiting as a means of experiencing time underlines the lived experience of temporality in a phenomenological understanding of the lifeworld.

IX

Conclusion: A Discursive Shift toward Poststructuralism?

Phenomenology got out of hand and climbed down below the severed head when Husserl wasn't looking.

(David Jardine, 1992b, p. 129)

Phenomenology does not represent merely another "approach" to curriculum, merely another orientation or perspective. One cannot "try on" phenomenology or easily invoke it on specific occasions. One cannot because phenomenology is not only another language system, it suggests altered relationships to language itself. The phenomenological task is to live so that language becomes visible, becomes, in Heidegger's term, a "lens." To become distantiated from language to permit such a relationship requires an "ontological" shift, back from the everyday and the taken-for-granted, to the preconceptual, to the body. Some scholars point to the intersections between phenomenology and other traditions in curriculum thought, intersections which might serve as correctives to the narrowness of traditional curriculum theory. In this regard, Leigh Chiarelott (1983a) argued (not unlike Huebner) that in traditional curriculum development:

We have [had] to accept a very narrow view of experience in our design and development of curriculum. . . . A major next step is the continued analysis and criticism of theories of experience and the synthesis of both phenomenological and pragmatic perspectives. (p. 39)

The phenomenological research agenda—in itself and in collaboration with other traditions such as Deweyan pragmatism—holds enormous promise for understanding curriculum as a lived text. At the same time it frightens conservative students of curriculum, who tend to react to the language and the topics as esoteric. For those with intellectual courage, however, the phenomenological path offers rewards commensurate with the apparent risk, as we believe the studies described in this chapter illustrate. Phenomenology promises not only a revised curriculum; phenomenology promises a revised way of life.

Poststructuralism contests phenomenology. As we will see in the next chapter, poststructuralism contests the ontology and epistemology of phenomenology. For instance, the binary distinction between experience and language, experience and conceptualization, is denied. The phenomenological dictum that the conceptual sphere rests upon and derives from a preconceptual, antepredicative sphere is denied by poststructuralists. To be described, even "dumb" experience, Derrida insisted, becomes discourse. Original purity of experience cannot be achieved; while it is implied, it does not exist as text. In the beginning was flesh, but the flesh became word. Lyotard wrote:

In so far as this life-originating world is antepredicative, all predication, all discourse, undoubtedly implies, yet is wide of it, and properly speaking nothing may be said of it. . . . The Husserlian description . . . is a struggle of language against itself to attain the originary. . . . In this struggle, the defeat of the philosopher, of the logos, is assured, since the originary, once described, is thereby no longer originary (quoted in Descombes, 1980, p. 16).

Lyotard does not deny that experience and discourse are distinguishable. He does insist that for "dumb" experience to speak—in language, in the look, in the gesture—it becomes discourse. Discourse includes meaning latent in experience but perhaps not yet articulated.

Language occupies the space of separation. For poststructuralists, then, meaning is discursive. Meaning can represent only approximations of original experience. Language is said to occupy the space between experience and the word, or logos. Lacan (1977) located metaphor exactly at the point where meaning is produced out of nonmeaning. Merleau-Ponty anticipated this view: "It is true that we should never talk about anything if we were limited to talking about those experiences which we coincide, since speech is already a separation. . . . [But] the primary meaning of discourse is to be found in that text of experience which it is trying to communicate" (1962, p. 388). Discourse as speech or writing occupies that space which separates us, that space which is termed the "social." Thus "the word" is inextricably human, inextricably political, as Foucault documented in his studies of the discursive systems associated with madness, sexuality, and knowledge (Foucault, 1979, 1980a, 1980b). Merleau-Ponty anticipated this view also: "in the use of our body and our sense in so far as they involve us in the world, we have the means of understanding our cultural gesticulation, in so far as it involves us in history" (1962, p. 82).

Husserl's phenomenology attempted to order and stabilize the flux of experience via the eidetic reduction, by bracketing that flux and discerning its essences (Caputo, 1987). Heidegger invoked deconstruction to violate the everyday, the taken-for-granted sphere we construct and employ to evade the ontological facts of our fallenness, our being-toward-death. In *Being and Time*, deconstruction functions to disrupt mindless tradition and thus acts in service of the recovery and retrieval of Being. Deconstruction functions in the hermeneutic circle to set free the primordial (Caputo, 1987). In this

movement Heidegger sets the stage for Derrida. Derrida radicalizes deconstruction so that hermeneutics itself is deconstructed. For Heidegger "understanding" sets free what is hidden from view by overlays of tradition, prejudice, and evasion. "Interpretation" represents movements toward such understanding. For both Heidegger and Husserl, phenomenological understanding moves from originary experience through language and back again. For Heidegger, originary experience does not preclude the linguistic. He acknowledges discourse as an essential constituent element of the "there." Interpretation is the conceptual working out of preexistent understanding, coming to know what we "knew" already, albeit obscurely. Empirical "proofs" have no place in hermeneutical understanding; to know phenomenologically is to allow to unfold what is already present but not yet seen (Caputo, 1987).

Fragility and contingency. Derrida repudiates Heidegger's epistemology; he has no interest in the language of "homecoming," "mystery," "unfolding," and "Being." He views Heidegger's epistemology as nostalgia for a time past, a time that never was. Derrida insists that hiding in the mist of nostalgia is a metaphysics of order in which the reality of flux becomes tamed and distorted. He suspects any moves that slow the movement and arrest the play of language and experience. Caputo observed that Derrida is more faithful to Nietzsche than to Heidegger, insisting that we always remain aware of the fragility and contingency of what we think and do (Caputo, 1987). David W. Jardine's (1992a, 1992b) work has moved out from phenomenology toward poststructuralism, and it resides somewhere between the two. It expresses phenomenological themes, in deconstructed fashion, indicating its recent movement toward poststructuralism. In *Speaking with a Boneless Tongue*, Jardine (1992b) writes playfully but with insight: "Phenomenology got out of hand and climbed down below the severed head when Husserl wasn't looking" (p. 129). For Jardine, phenomenology is both embodied and political: "Hope and despair," Jardine tells us in another place, "[are] the moods of colonialism" (p. 162). However, he is not seduced by a poststructuralist hunger for moving on for the sake of moving on: "If home is abandoned altogether—if we all get caught up in 'leaving'—our care for and devotion to the conditions, sources, and intimate dependencies of renewal and generativity are also abandoned" (p. 177). Jardine lives on the edge of phenomenology, in the margin of poststructuralism, a space into which the "old master" of phenomenological curriculum theory—Ted Aoki (1993a)—has also moved recently. That these important figures are redoing phenomenology in light of poststructuralism suggests that this sector too may soon undergo dramatic discursive shifts.

Understanding curriculum as deconstructed text acknowledges knowledge as preeminently historical. Here, however, history is not understood as only ideologically constructed, rather as a series of narratives superimposed upon each other, interlaced among each other, layers of story merged and separated like colors in a Jackson Pollock painting. The stories we tell in schools, formalized as disciplines, are always others' stories, always conveying motives

and countermotives, dreams, and nightmares. To understand curriculum as deconstructed (and deconstructing) text is to tell stories that never end, stories in which the listener, the "narratee," may become a character or indeed the narrator, in which all structure is provisional, momentary, a collection of twinkling stars in a firmament of flux. Into the flux in chapter 9.

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